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1CHAPTER ONE
THE QUESTION AND POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS
One of the most striking characteristics of Third World countries is 
political instability. Although not all Third World states are politically unstable, 
witness for example Saudi Arabia and Nepal, many nations of both 
democratic and authoritarian leanings have experienced strong political 
challenges in maintaining established political order and national unity. These 
political challenges can take the forms of mass demonstration, riots or even 
coups.
Indonesia, as one of the relatively new independent nations, shares 
this characteristic of Third World states. After more than forty years as an 
independent nation, Indonesia has witnessed a complete range of political 
upheavals to an extent rivalled by few other Third World nations. Indonesia 
experienced a "democratic" state, then civilian authoritarianism and finally a 
government with a pronounced military component. However, there is a 
marked difference between the period before 1966 and since 1966, that is 
between the period of the presidency of Soekarno and the period of Suharto’s 
New Order government“! .
1. The political event that divided the Soekarno and Soeharto 
periods or the Old Order and the New Order periods, was the bloody 
coup of the 30 September movement and its excesses, until 11 March 
1966 when General Soeharto effectively took over power from President 
Soekarno
2During the Soekarno era, the central government underwent a number of 
challenges that indicated its instability. Apart from challenges at the centre, the 
most serious threat to national unity came from a number of rebellions in the 
regions. These included the very long-lived Darul Islam rebellions in West 
Java, Aceh, and Sulawesi, and the shorter PRRI-Permesta rebellion. All these 
regional rebellions were brought under control by the end of the Soekarno 
presidency in 1966.
In the Suharto era, regional rebellions have been nowhere near as 
serious, having regard to duration, location, attraction of elite support and extent 
of disruption. While the Darul Islam and PRRI rebellions affected large areas of 
the 'core' of Indonesia, including even Java, the regional rebellions of the 
Suharto era have been in peripheral regions, and moreover in regions 
incorporated into Indonesia more recently than the remainder of its territory — 
Timor, and Irian Jaya, where the Organisasi Papua Merdeka has been active 
since 1963. These two cases, particularly Timor with its international 
dimension, can be seen as exceptions to the general rule that regional 
challenges to the central government have been much less prominent. Why is 
the Suharto government more successful in this area? Many explanations have 
been offered in attempting to answer that question.
First, many of the scholars studying Indonesian political, social or 
economic development have turned their attention to the typical characteristics 
of the newly emerging state. In many new emerging states there is a 
fundamental shift from a governmental system base on civilian rule to one in 
which there is an increasing role for the armed forces and even military rule. 
The new states, beset by problems of national unity, political instability, 
economic stagnation and corruption often turn to an authoritarian military 
government for a solution to these problems2 . Indonesia has followed this 
pattern. There has been a governmental and political power shift from civilian to 
military rule. After 1966, the period of the presidency of General Soeharto, the 
military virtually ruled the state. The military-dominated government, had extra 
powers to use coercion and suppression against its political rivals including 
resistance and opposition in the regions.
2 See for example, Huntington (1968), Janowits (1964) and Pauker (1962)
Secondly, there appears to be greater integration of the political elite in 
the New Order government. Within the military itself there is a relatively 
uniform political outlook among regional commanders and the central 
command in Jakarta. This sense of a common political outlook is also shared 
with civilian elites of both the outer island regions and of Java. Thus during the 
New Order period there has been better communication, stronger personal 
ties and a common outlook among the different sections of the political elite. 
In particular they share a common hostility to Soekarno’s Old Order and to 
the Communists. Apparently, so long as the elites in both the regions and the 
centre are closely linked, there is less likelihood of regional unrest, let alone 
regional challenge. In short there is a significant sense of common political 
outlook among the elites of the outer island regions and the Javanese elite. 
This factor will be examined in more detail in chapter four since it is an 
important part of an overall understanding of the success of the New Order 
government.
The third possible factor lies in the central government’s development 
policy. The government’s development strategy has apparently been designed 
and implemented in such away so that it is able increasingly to fulfil not only 
popular needs but most importantly the rising material expectations of those 
involved in the political game, whether prominent civilian figures or the 
military.
While the factors outlined above all have merit and are not mutually 
exclusive, I believe that the third hypothesis is very important although it is 
usually neglected in discussions of the problem of national stability and unity. 
Although suppression by a strong central government might contribute to the 
maintenance of stability in the centre and the regions in the short run, in the 
long run no regime can rely exclusively on the capacity to use coercion and 
suppression to dampen down all political unrest. Similarly, although the
emergence of a common outlook among the political leaders might contribute 
to national cohesion in the short run, in political life there is no eternal 
uniformity of political outlook. Today’s loyal followers can become tomorrow’s 
strong opponents.
It is clear therefore that national unity, integration and stability cannot 
be secured in the long run by suppression of resisting groups and coercion of 
the masses, nor through elite integration and a high sense of national 
awareness alone. Long term stability and integration also requires 
"maintenance" or rewards to both the political elites and the masses. The 
process of distributing economic rewards, however is not simply a matter of 
handing over money; there must be a vehicle a policy through which "rewards" 
are distributed. Therefore, this thesis will be focused on national development 
policy. How has the New Order regime implemented its development policy, 
what priorities has the regime emphasized in its development goals, what 
are the effects on stability , and how has development policy contributed to 
the maintenance of the regime and particularly national unity?
In short, this thesis will study the development policy of the New Order 
government. This study however assumes that politics cannot be separated 
from economic issues and that political factors such as political stability and a 
strong central government are an integral part of development policy. 
Therefore in this thesis will firstly be discussed the problem of national unity 
or national integration of the Indonesian nation which is considered as the 
central problem of Indonesian political stability. Secondly, this thesis will look 
back to the regional rebellions during the Soekarno period, since they were a 
clear example of the instability that threatened national unity. This discussion 
is important to see whether the real cause of these insurrections sprang from 
the problem of national unity itself or had other causes. Finally, this thesis will 
discuss the solution undertaken by the New Order regime to foster unity and
5maintain stability - a solution which contained both political and economic 
aspects.
CHAPTER TWO
THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION
According to Coleman and Rosberg Jr, "National-Integration" involves 
two major dimensions : 1) Political integration which refers to a progressive 
bridging of the elite-mass gap on the vertical plane and 2) Territorial 
integration, which refers to the progressive reduction of cultural and regional 
tensions and other discontinuities on a horizontal plane in the process of 
creating a homogeneous territorial political community (Coleman and Rosberg 
Jr. 1964: 8-9). A similar definition has been used by Liddle but with different 
terms. He uses the terms "horizontal" and "vertical" for Coleman and 
Rosberg’s "territorial" and "political" distinctions (Liddle, 1970). These 
concepts are useful in examining the case of national integration in Indonesia. 
Indonesia is a country which comprises many different regionally 
fragmented elements, and also shows a wide gap between the elite and the 
mass.
This thesis will focus primarily on the "horizontal problems", that is the 
problems that have a bearing on Indonesia’s national unity. Horizontal 
cleavages represent a potential threat to the physical integrity of the state, 
particularly in Indonesia where each ethnic group tends to have its own 
ideological and religious identity and to be localized in a certain region. The 
vertical problem however will also be discused because although it is not as 
prominent as is the horizontal cleavage, in fact it is also a serious threat to 
national stability.
11.1. The Horizontal problem.
The problem facing Indonesia in maintaining national unity, like most 
other Southeast Asian nations, mainly originates from its own "distinctive 
personality" (to borrow Fisher’s term); most Southeast Asian countries, 
although each stands as a national unit, are fragmented and ethnically and 
culturally diverse. They are plural alike in economy and in society, (Fisher 
1964: 9). This description is applicable to Indonesia and is indirectly but 
clearly revealed by Indonesia’s national motto, "Bhinneka Tunggal Ika" or 
"unity in diversity" The choice of this motto suggests that Indonesia 
recognizes the existence of various ethnic groups, languages and religions 
existing within one nation and one state.
In Indonesia there are more than three hundred ethnic groups speaking 
more than two hundred and fifty languages (Geertz 1963: 24). As an 
archipelagic state Indonesia consists of more than 3000 islands, divided into 
29 provinces. Some provinces consist of more than one island and are 
populated by more than one ethnic group. Nawawi divides the country into 
twelve major regions based on major population concentrations, each 
representing a major ethnic group which possesses common customs and a 
distinctive identity distinguishing it from the neighbouring groups. The largest 
ethnic group is the Javanese, inhabiting Central, and East Java and 
constituting about 45 percent of the Indonesian population, while West Java is 
the region of the Sundanese ethnic group, the second largest ethnic group. 
In Sumatra the main ethnic groups are Acehnese, Tapanuli Bataks, East 
Sumatrans, Minangkabau, and the Palembang people in South Sumatra. In 
Kalimantan, there are the people of West Kalimantan and Banjar. In Sulawesi, 
the ethnic groups consist of the Bugis and Makasarese who are mostly in 
South Sulawesi, while North Sulawesi is largely inhabitted by Minahasans. In 
East Indonesia live the Ambonese in South Maluku. Bali, although regarded
8by many scholars as part of Java, is considered by Nawawi as a separate
ethnic group with its own distinctive religion, Hinduism (Nawawi 1969 : 934-
945). Each of Nawawi’s major population groups possesses a deeply rooted
ethnic loyalty. This situation is described well by Feith when he said:
" Other things being equal, Javanese found it easier to work with 
other Javanese than with other people of other groups in politics 
or in other matters, and the same can be said for Achenese, 
Balinese and Minahasans" (Feith 1962: 28)
Moreover ethnic loyalties in Indonesia to some extent also coincide 
with different religious beliefs. There are four major religions in Indonesia; 
Islam, Christianity, Hinduism and Buddhism. In addition, Muslims in Java can 
be divided into two distinct groups i.e. Santri and Abangan. The Santri are 
regarded as pious, practising Islam, while the Abangan are nominally Muslim 
and still practise syncretism, involving Animist, Hindu and Buddhist elements 
combined with Islamic beliefs and practices (Geertz 1960). A majority of 
Javanese are identified as Abangan while a substantial minority are Santri. On 
the other hand the Sundaneses and the outer island ethnic groups such as 
the Minangkabau, the Bugis, Makasarese and the Mandailing are usually 
strong Muslims. The Balinese are almost all Hindus and there are also 
pockets of Christians (Geertz 1960).
In the revolutionary and early post-independence period ethnic diversity 
and religious distinction became the basis of ideological segregation. Political 
parties mobilized their supporters from various ethnic groups, with the main 
division being between Javanese on one hand and the Sundanese of West 
Java with the ethnic groups of the outer islands on the other. Thus ethnic and 
religious cleavages lay behind confrontation between political parties. In Java 
the NU (Nahdlatul Ulama). an Islamic Scholars party was a santri-based 
Muslim party while the PNI (Partai National Indonesia), was an abangan- 
based party. The PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia) was also a predominantly 
Javanese abangan-based party (Mortimer 1981 : 615-32). Another Muslim
party, Masjumi, had strong support from the outer islands and West Java. 
Therefore, before 1965 the Javanese abangans were mainly supporters of 
either the PNI or the PKI, Javanese santris were predominantly supporters of 
the NU, while the Masjumi was dominant among the Sundanese of West Java 
and the outer islands. With the introduction of party ideologies, the loyalties of 
the people were no longer tied merely to their ethnic group and to their 
religions but also to their political parties. In many cases the ideology was 
adopted with minimum comprehension, or was even followed with blind 
fanaticism, because most of the followers had little education or were even 
totally uneducated. During that period the rate of illiteracy in Indonesia, as in 
most ex-Western colonies or newly independent nations, was unquestionably 
very high. Paauw noted that the Dutch left an illiteracy rate in Indonesia of 
almost 90 percent (Paauw 1960: 6).
Before the intrusion of party ideologies Skinner observed that 
traditional loyalties were related to the structure of kinship, religion or the civil- 
adat administrative hierarchy (Skinner 1959). These traditional loyalties later 
provided a strong basis for loyalties to ideology. Feith said that ties of 
common ethnic membership were frequently an important part of the cement 
of political groupings (Feith 1962 : 28).
During the period of parliamentary democracy and guided democracy, 
traditional loyalties were competing with loyalty to the state. Officials of 
ministries and departments within the bureaucracy, rather than serving society 
as a whole, were more concerned with their own group.
Especially after the indoctrination of ideology by political parties, 
bureaucrats gave more attention to political groupings than to their duty to 
operate their ministry as an organ of the state. For example Feith observed 
that in 1958 all ministries were subject to a variety of effective political controls 
but the legal checks in most cases were extremely weak (Feith 1963: 389-
409). Further, Liddle explained that the PNI was well represented in the 
Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Home Affairs which controlled the 
territorial and civil service or Pamonq pradia (Liddle 1970). Thus the horizontal 
cleavages in the form of ethnic, religious and regional interests had also been 
introduced into governmental institutions and created inter-departmental 
competition as bureaucrats often concentrated on serving their own particular 
group. This is one reason why the New Order government required all civil 
servants to join the Civil Servant Association of the Republic of Indonesia or 
Korps Peaawai Republik Indonesia (KORPRl). in the hope that this would 
reduce the tendency to serve their own ethnic, religious or ideological group. 
KORPRl was established by a Presidential Edict with the provision that for all 
civil servants there was to be a single loyalty, mono-loyalty, that is to the 
government through Golkar.
Aside from differences originating from the nature of the society, there 
are also other major problems that threaten Indonesian national unity. These 
include unequal distribution of natural resources between Java and the outer 
islands, the uneven population distribution and the unequal infrastructural 
development between Java and the outer island regions. Since the colonial 
era the Dutch had exploited the Indonesian archipelago and created the 
dichotomy between Java and the export-producing regions with their rich 
natural resources in the outer islands. The Dutch centralized their government 
in Java so that Java became the core and the outer islands become the 
periphery. The less populated outer islands became the producers and the 
sources of wealth for the people of Java, especially those of Central and East 
Java, which were over-populated and resource poor. At the same time, Java’s 
infrastructure was more developed than that of the outer island regions.
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11.2. The Vertical problem.
Another typical characteristic of most newly independent nations is that 
national integration has always been overshadowed by the social and 
economic gap between the elite and the mass. In Indonesia during the Old 
Order period, the PKI (the Indonesian Communist Party) was able to gain a 
great deal of mass support by exploiting the gap between elite and mass to an 
extent only rivalled by the PNI (the Indonesian Nationalist Party) in terms of 
mass support.
In some respects Indonesia’s vertical integration problem, although 
certainly serious, is less obvious than the horizontal problems. Feudal values 
are strongly maintained by the ruling groups in Indonesia and tend to obscure 
vertical divisions. The paternalism of Indonesian society, according to which 
members of the elite i.e mainly the high officials (pejabat tinqqi). are regarded 
as bapak (father) by the mass, means that the mass as good children must 
always obey their bapak. Even in Javanese society, where vertical divisions 
are most marked, the mass apparently has accepted this separation willingly. 
According to James Mysberg :
"To most villagers, the contemporary elite is seen as a 
continuation of the old aristocracy and is accorded respect on 
the basis of a traditional acceptance of "autocratic power" and a 
hierarchical system which imply privilege rather than mutual 
obligation" (James Mysberg 1957: 39).
Thus, although the Indonesian society is characterized by a wide gap
between elite and mass, class divisions are not as dangerous as horizontal
cleavages. This situation is clearly described by Soekamto who said :
"Indonesia has no general social structure which can serve as a 
framework for the entire society. The society is composed of a 
large number of fluid groups, which tend to be parochial. 
Ethnical, religious and ideological groupings are more important 
than class differences " (Soekamto S. 1973: 58).
12
Although the wide gap between elite and mass, which is reflected in 
term of income disparity, is often simply accepted by the mass at the bottom, 
income disparities between the small group of people and the vast majority of 
the Indonesian people can also cause outbreaks of dissatisfaction. On many 
occasions mass dissatisfaction has burst out in riots, particularly anti-Chinese 
riots, which to some extent were manifestations of the dissatisfaction of the 
mass toward those who were economically well-off. However, this cleavage 
never really threatened national unity, in the sense that it has never 
transformed itself into a political movement challenging the existence of the 
government.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE CAUSES OF REGIONAL REBELLION
Since horizontal cleavages, as I mentioned earlier, are very 
conspicuous in Indonesia, it is essential to discuss regional rebellions. In 
many aspects they reflect the worst horizontal problems that have ever 
occurred in Indonesia.
"Regional rebellion" in this study refers to rebellion by the people of a 
particular region against the existing national state. In such a rebellion the 
people make demands by force upon a government in the name of the region 
and ostensibly on behalf of the region. The demands are not necessarily for 
the creation of a separate state but may also be in the form of a demand for 
regional political autonomy which could embrace economic and legal 
exceptionalism, for example the case of the special area of Aceh (Morris 
1983). A rebellion can break out as a culmination of dissatisfaction in the 
region with the central government. The regional people demand a change in 
central government policy although not necessarily separation. It is therefore 
important to note that not all regional rebellions are secessionist movements, 
although they have the potential for separatism. However regional rebellions 
always run counter to the process of national integration or national unity.
The reasons for regional challenge can derive from many factors; 
political, social, economic, or even personal rivalries. One important reason 
for the outbreak of rebellion is deep-rooted regionalist feeling. According to 
Nawawi, "regionalism" is simply a strong sentiment of loyalty or attachment on 
the part of the population of a geographical region to that particular territory 
(Nawawi 1985), or what Geertz has called "primordial-attachment". 
Rebellions however are not solely based on sentiment, feeling or strong
primordial ties even though strong primordial-attachment is usually exploited 
by regional elite groups, particularly if economic or political dissatisfaction is 
rising. Regional challenges can also be a manifestation of strong competition 
or rivalries among elites, particularly the elite within the army.
In Indonesia the causes of regional challenges to the central 
government before 1966 have been very complicated. Regional challenges 
were often a manifestation of the personal dissatisfaction of rebel leaders 
toward the central government leadership, interlinked with ethnic, religious 
and economic interests.
In the following part of this thesis, I will discuss the causes of regional 
rebellions by analyzing the Darul Islam rebellion and the PRRI/Permesta 
rebellion. These rebellions were two of the most important to have taken place 
in Indonesia, and in many aspects provide a clear picture of serious intra-elite 
conflict.
111.1. The Darul Islam Rebellion.
The Darul Islam rebellion, led by Kartosuwirjo, initially broke out in 
West Java and then spilled over into the western part of Central Java. 
Kartosuwirjo later allied with the rebellion in South Sulawesi led by Kahar 
Muzakar, and with Daud Beureu’eh’s rebellion in Aceh, and was also 
supported by Ibnu Hadjar, the rebel leader in Kalimantan. However the 
rebellion in Kalimantan was minor compared to the other three.
The rebellion broke out during the national revolution against the Dutch 
when troops of the Hisbullah and Sabilillah, led by Kartosuwirjo, rejected the 
Renville agreement of 1948 which provided for their evacuation from West 
Java (Boland 1971, Horikoshi 1975, van Dijk 1981). Kartosuwirjo considered
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that the Renville agreement represented the defeat of the Republic against 
the Dutch and therefore could not accept it. An Islamic state itself was not yet 
formed but was only proclaimed in August 1949 when the final agreement 
between the Republican leaders and the Dutch was signed (Feith 1962, Reid 
1974). This agreement known as the "van Royen-Roem agreement", was 
strongly criticised by Kartosuwirjo (Pinardi 1964).
Long before the Renville agreement, Kartosuwirjo had been alienated 
from the Republican leadership, apparently because he had not been given 
any position after independence in the Republic. According to van Dijk, during 
the discussion of the draft constitution, particularly during the debate 
concerning the amendment of the Jakarta Charted, Kartosuwirjo and his 
associate, Kamran, who before the Japanese occupation had championed 
total hijrah4, were not given a chance to voice their opinion concerning the 
state ideology and the content of the Jakarta charter (C.van Dijk 1981: 59). 
Kartosuwirjo, in fact had also quarrelled with his members of his own party, 
the Masjumi. His long standing dispute with his colleagues had come to an 
open conflict because he could not get definitive support from the Masjumi in
3. The Djakarta Charter was the proposed preamble of the constitution. 
The Muslim members had been able to persuade other members of the 
committee to place referring to Principle of Belief in God, as the 
first pillar. In the former preamble the principle of Belief in God 
was not the first pillar. In addition, the words 'belief in God' were 
followed by the clause 'with the obligation for the adherents of 
Islam to practise Islamic law' (Boland 1971:27, van Dijk 1981:47-48). 
In Indonesian the additional words were as follows ' dencran kewajiban 
menialankan siariat Islam bacri para penqanut nva'.
4. ' Hi j rah' is the word which is used to designate the departure of 
the prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in 622 AD. The prophet 
Muhammad with his followers evacuated from Mecca to Medina to 
rearrange and to consolidate their force which enabled him to take 
over Mecca and gain a final and total victory. Therefore, the word 
'hijrah' is used to indicate a tactic of withdrawal of force to 
prepare for a final blow toward a total victory. The term 'hijrah' 
later was used by the Republican Siliwangi Division of West Java 
which had to withdraw its forces from West Java to Central Java.
his opposition to the terms of the Renville agreement. C.van Dijk illuminates 
this clearly when he writes :
"As a consequence of the Renville agreement, the rupture 
between Kartosuwirjo and Masjumi became definitive and 
irrevocable. Masjumi, although opposing the agreement itself, 
shortly after its signing became a government party and so 
came to share the responsibility for the observance of the 
agreement and was obliged itself to comply with it. Hence it 
could not follow Kartosuwirjo in his rejection of it" (van Dijk 
1981:85).
Ironically, as a manifestation of Kartosuwirjo’s dissatisfaction and his 
rivalry with the Republican leaders, it was the new independent Republic 
which became the target of his attack, not the Dutch (Pinardi 1964). Further 
according to van Dijk, Kartosuwirjo even cooperated with the Dutch, i.e. with 
Jungschlager and Schmidt, in the Dutch APRA (the Just King Army or 
Anqkatan Peranq Ratu Adil) military action. The Dutch agreed to supply 
weaponry to Kartosuwirjo with which he could attack the Republicans in the 
villages (C. van Dijk 1981: 101). Perhaps as a manifestation of his 
disagreement with fellow Masjumi men, Kartosuwiryo also attacked other 
prominent figures (Pinardi 1964). The above evidence, put forward by various 
writers has raised the question of whether Kartosuwirjo’s rebellion was based 
on a strong commitment to Islam or merely a personal dissatisfaction with his 
colleagues in both the Republic and the Masjumi.
It is difficult to see Kartosuwirjo’s rebellion as merely a manifestation of 
conflict between Muslims on one hand and nominal Muslims and non-Muslims 
on the other. Kartosuwirjo had a longstanding conflict with other Masjumi 
leaders and later disengaged from Masjumi. Furthermore, Kartosuwirjo’s own 
Islamic training, as well as his Islamic education, was very meagre and lagged 
far behind that of other Indonesian Islamic leaders (Horikoshi 1975: 73, Noer 
1973: 148, Pinardi 1964: 29-30).
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On the other hand, Kartosuwirjo’s rebellion cannot be regarded as a 
West Javanese regional rebellion against the central government, since 
Kartosuwirjo himself was not West Javanese. According to Syamsuddin, 
Kartosuwirjo’s Dl (Darul Islam) lacked popular support from both the ulama 
and masses. The rebels consisted of a mixture of ambitious politicians, 
guerrilla leaders, bandits and peasants. Further, Sjamsuddin argues that this 
fight was no longer in line with Islam but was merely organized terror and 
robbery. Therefore Kartosuwirjo failed to gain sympathy, let alone recruit 
massive support from the people (Sjamsuddin 1985: 243-44).
Although the Darul Islam rebellion in West Java was later linked with 
Kahar Muzakar’s rebellion in South Sulawesi and Daud Beureu’eh’s in Aceh, 
and they each used Islam as the basis for their confrontation against the 
central government, they were each different in their relations with the people 
in their region.
Like Kartosuwirjo, Kahar was also a man who did not gain any position 
in the Republic after independence. According to Harvey, Kahar was upset 
because he had not been given military territorial command (Harvey 1974: 
211) Kahar fully merged with Kartosuwirjo’s Islamic State in July 1953 and he 
later proclaimed Sulawesi and surrounding areas, including West Irian, as 
part of it on 7th of August 1953, four years after Kartosuwirjo’s proclamation of 
his Islamic state. Kahar apparently cooperated because he was appointed as 
representative for that area. He later became more involved in the Islamic 
State with his appointment on January 1st, 1955, as First Deputy Minister of 
Defence in the government of the Islamic State of Indonesia (C. van Dijk 1981 
:188-89).
The sequence of events suggests that Kahar may have only supported 
the concept of an Islamic state after he got assurance that his ambition, which
had not been satisfied by the central government, would be fulfilled by 
Kartosuwirjo, even only on paper.
However there were many differences between the nature Kahar’s 
relations with the regional people and Kartosuwirjo’s. In South Sulawesi, 
Kahar Muzakar was able to manipulate adat or local tradition, particularly Sirik 
(lineage) and Pese (kinship) (Sjamsuddin 1985 :243-44). Kahar was able to 
use ethnic traditions because Kahar, unlike Kartosuwirjo, was originally from 
the same region of his followers. Therefore Kahar Muzakar in his challenge 
against the central government was able to exploit regional sentiment, and 
ethnic loyalty, and was also able to involve ulamas. Kahar Muzakar also 
emphasized building an egalitarian society, which was never mentioned by 
Kartosuwirjo let alone by Daud Beureu’eh in Aceh. For example, he tried to 
eliminate all traditional titles such as andi. daeng. raden. He even prohibited 
Islamic titles such as haji (C.van Dijk 1981 :192), which was clearly an attack 
on the pride of those Muslims who made the pilgrimage to Mecca.
In addition to using ethnic loyalty to win mass support, Kahar also 
made contact with Leftists and Communists. Despite indications that he had 
no strong commitment to Islam, Kahar Muzakar nevertheless realized that 
only by using Islam could he continue the struggle (Harvey 1974: 253). Thus, 
personal dissatisfaction appeared to be a major factor in the rebellion of Kahar 
Muzakar. Regional loyalties and religious aims were involved because these 
were the means of gaining mass support against the central government.
The case of Daud Beureu’eh’s rebellion was even more complicated as 
it was a reflection of rivalries among political elites, i.e. the religious elites or 
Ulama against the traditional elites or Uleebalang and the military elites. This 
rivalry, as usual, had its origin in the revolutionary period, long before 
independence. According to Reid, the rivalry was initially between the 
reformist scholars or ulama, and the traditional elites or Uleebalang. It turned
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into a bloody conflict for leadership in the society where economic interests 
were at stake (Reid 1975)
The religious leaders in Aceh were united in the Ulama organization, 
called PUSA (Persatuan Ulama Seluruh Aceh). Daud Beureu’eh was one of 
its founders and later became its chairman. The Uleebalangs, because of their 
position in the colonial administration, were hated and regarded as infidels by 
the ulama. Before independence and particularly before the social revolution 
which erupted a few months after the Japanese defeat, the Uleebalang not 
only held high positions in the society but also controlled most of the 
economic resources (C. van Dijk 1981). For example, Siegel pointed out in 
Pidie alone, Uleebalang owned between a third and half of the total ricefields 
(Siegel 1969:27).
That the conflict was not merely religious in nature is clearly shown by 
the actions of the ulama, who, long before the Japanese landed in Indonesia, 
had cooperated with them and later assisted them to get rid of the Dutch from 
Aceh. Many authors have noted that the assistance of the Ulama to the 
Japanese was not exclusively inspired by anti-Dutch feeling. They wanted to 
be rewarded by being given the position that was held by the Uleebalang, and 
at the same time abolish the power of of the Uleebalang (Reid 1974 : 65, 
Reid 1975 : 49-61, C. van Dijk 1981 :271-72). However, according to van 
Dijk, in the first month of independence, many Uleebalang actively supported 
the Republicans and, in turn, the Republicans looked to the Uleebalang to run 
the administration because they were regarded as more educated than other 
members of society (C. van Dijk 1981). Therefore a few months after the 
Japanese surrender, the Uleebalangs were attacked by the ulama. Those who 
survived not only lost their positions but also their property which was seized 
by the ulama, in particular the PUSA leaders (C.van Dijk 1981: 273).
Thus, it is hard to regard the conflict between the ulamas under PUSA 
and the Uleebalangs as a purely religious struggle for the sake of the 
common people. Clearly it was a conflict over leadership in the society and 
over economic wealth. Boland (1974) and van Dijk (1981) comment strongly 
on this . Boland writes:
"It was in fact in no way a religious conflict, merely a 
political and social one" (Boland 1971 : 70)
while van Dijk writes :
"It was evidently the Islamic leaders and not the 
common people who benefited by the confiscation of the 
Uleebalangs’ wealth (c. van Dijk 1981: 273).
After the Japanese defeat, according to van Dijk, the civil 
administration was already dominated by PUSA while the Army was 
increasingly becoming an instrument of the Uleebalang (C. van Dijk 1981: 
295-96). Consequently the conflict developed into a movement of the Ulama 
against the military of the newly independent Republic in order to win political 
and military power. To a significant extent military power was also a source of 
economic wealth, particularly since military power was necessary to protect 
the trade between Aceh and Malaya. Like everywhere else in Indonesia the 
military was anti-Communist but in Aceh it also confronted PUSA.
The dissatisfaction of PUSA leaders with the central government was 
made worse, not only because of the interference of the central government in 
its conflict against the Uleebalangs, but also because the Aceh administration 
was under the province of North Sumatra. According to van Dijk this was one 
of the immediate causes of the rebellion. Under this structure, the economic 
resources of Aceh were under the control of North Sumatra, and 
administrative procedures became a bureaucratic handicap to trade in Aceh. 
Further North Sumatra was predominantly non-Muslim, i.e. Christian-Batak. 
The economic problems of this administrative structure directly affected the 
upper level of society as illustrated by van Dijk in the case of Amir Husin al
Mujahid. During the revolutionary period when Aceh was a separate and 
semi-autonomous administrative entity, Amir Husin al Mujahid gained control 
of the oil-fields in East Aceh as General Manager of the Aceh Oil Mining 
company or Tambanq Minvak Aceh. After Aceh was reincorporated into the 
province of North Sumatra, the company was renamed Tambang Minjak 
Sumatra Utara and extended its control to the oil-field at Pangkalanbrandan. 
The headquarter was also moved from Aceh to Pangkalanbrandan. As a 
result, the oil-fields of Aceh were no longer managed by Amir Husin al 
Mujahid but came under the control of the Pangkalanbrandan headquarters ( 
van Dijk 1981: 357-58). In this case, we can see it was only the leaders who 
were economically affected; it did not make any difference for the common 
people and the laborers whether the headquarters were in Aceh or in 
Pangkalanbrandan, as their wages remained unchanged.
The PUSA rebellion led by Daud Beureu’eh was not integrated with 
Kartosuwirjo’s movement for an Islamic State, as indicated by the fact that the 
rebellion in Aceh broke out five years after that of Kartosuwirjo. According to 
Feith (1964) and Boland (1971) the delay was because Daud Beureu’eh 
initially adopted a moderate policy by relying on the influence of the Masjumi 
in the cabinet. But when Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo excluded the 
Masjumi from the cabinet, the rebellion broke out. Dissatisfaction with the 
central government reached its peak when the Masjumi, the party through 
which Daud Beureu’eh’s fought, not only failed to provide satisfactory results 
but was even excluded from the cabinet.
The argument of Feith and Boland implies that, had the Masjumi not 
been excluded, there would probably not have been a rebellion. The argument 
also tends to regard the rebellion as largely rooted in the conflict between 
Masjumi (the Muslim party) and the non-Muslim parties. However, as has 
been shown earlier, the rebellion of Daud Beureu’eh’s originated from the
conflict between the reformist scholars (ulama) and the Uleebalang. Although 
the Ulama accused the Uleebalang of being infidels (van Dijk 1981), the 
Uleebalang like all other Acehnese are strong Muslims5
Further there is no guarantee that had the Masjumi not been excluded
the rebellion would never have occurred. In fact during the New Order period,
although there is no representative of PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan)
in the cabinet, the Acehnese are firmly integrated with the central State. So
lack of Cabinet representation is not necessarily a cause of Acehnese
disaffection. It seems clear that the rebellion happened largely because
PUSA leaders were not satisfied with the policy of the central government
which was inclined to support their opponents (Sjamsuddin 1985: 327). It is
quite understandable that PUSA leaders would attack the government since
Uleebalang had for long been strong competitors with PUSA leaders for both
economic resources and prominent positions in the society. Sjamsuddin
illustrates the importance of economic interests clearly when he writes :
"When the central government banned the barter trade system 
between Aceh and Malaya in early 1952 the PUSA leaders 
were severely affected. Indeed the termination of barter trade 
nearly destroyed the entire economic power of the PUSA elite" 
(Sjamsuddin 1985 :113)
From the studies cited above we can see that apart from the common 
Islamic theme of the rebellions, the political and economic interests of the 
leaders were crucial. Further it is also clear that these regional rebellions were 
not primarily spontaneous movements of the people of the region. Rather the 
people were mobilized by the political elites, or they simply joined the leaders. 
Perhaps the difference between Daud Beureu’eh on one hand and Kahar 
Muzakar and Kartosuwirjo on the other, is that unlike Kahar Muzakar and
5. It is hardly possible to come across an Acehnese who is not a 
strong Muslim, whether he is a commoner or Uleebalang.
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Kartosuwirjo, Daud Beureu’eh was an ulama who gained outstanding 
support from the people, the elite and the mass (Sjamsuddin 1985). However 
it is not clear whether Daud Beureu’eh gained spontaneous support, that is 
support that does not need any appeal from leaders, or whether he gained 
mass support because he appealed to the people for their support on the 
basis of Islam and by accusing his opponents of being infidels.
III.2. The PRRI/Permesta Rebellions
It is commonly believed that the PRRI/Permesta revolt arose from a 
number of factors which caused resentment in parts of Sumatra and Sulawesi. 
It is sometimes argued that the revolt was partly motivated by ideology, 
especially Islamic alienation from a government dominated by abangan 
Javanese. The revolt is also sometimes seen in ethnic terms as a protest by 
non Javanese against Javanese domination. It is further suggested that 
regional dissidence had an economic base in that Java appeared to be the 
main beneficiary of exports originating in the outer islands. While there may 
be some truth in each of these explanation, they do not make up a complete 
explanation.
It is difficult to consider the PRRI/Permesta rebellion purely as an 
ideological challenge to the central government which originated from the 
confrontation between the PKI and PNI in Central and East Java and the 
Masjumi in the outer islands, or between Javanese abangan and the Muslim 
Masjumi of the outer Islands. In fact the rebels included both Muslims and 
Non-Muslims. The Minangkabau ethnic group in West Sumatra and the 
Mandailing Batak of South Tapanuli were predominantly Muslim, while the
6. PRRI: (the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia,
Pemerintahan Revolusioner Republic Indonesia)/ Permesta: (the
Universal Struggle, Perjuangan Semesta).
Minahasan and the Toba Bataks of North Tapanuli were chiefly Protestant. 
Nor can the rebellion be explained purely in ethnic terms as a conflict between 
Javanese on one side against non-Javanese on the other. In fact the rebels 
were also supported by prominent Javanese, such as Professor Sumitro. 
Feith and Lev point out that some of the rebels military hardware was bought 
cheaply from Taiwan as a result of the work of Prof. Sumitro, the rebels’ 
representative abroad (Feith and Lev 1963:41) Nor was the central 
government wholly Javanese government; in fact at that time, Maj. General 
Nasution, a Batak- Mandailing Muslim, was the chief of staff of the army and 
he agreed with President Soekarno on the importance of maintaining central 
government authority. That the conflict was not essentially ethnic or religious 
was also clear from the original rebel ultimatum which demanded that the 
existing cabinet under Prime Minister Djuanda resign and that parliament 
allow Hatta and the Sultan of Djogjakarta to form a new business cabinet, 
Hatta being a Muslim from Sumatra while the Sultan was the living 
embodiment of the Javanese world view (Feith and Lev 1963 : 35).
The cause of the rebellion also cannot be explained primarily in terms 
of the dichotomy between the outer island regions as export-producing 
regions (and thus the supplier of foreign exchange for the central government 
and the biggest contributor of government revenues derived from export) and 
Java as the beneficiary of these export revenues. It is also untrue that the 
rebellion broke out due to the unfair distribution of government spending 
between Java and the rest of Java. In this case Legge has demonstrated that 
the regions which produced the loudest complaints that they were being 
neglected, West Sumatra and North Sulawesi, were not the major contributors 
either to government revenues (through company tax and customs duties) or 
to the country’s reservoir of foreign currency. Further, he points out that in 
1956, Padang, the main port of West Sumatra, exported goods only to the 
value of Rp 187,300,000, a very small amount if compared to the total
exports of Rp 10,208,900,000. In fact during 1957, in spite of the fact that 
West Sumatra was technically out of the control of the central government, it 
still received from the central government provincial aid and maintenance 
service to the amount of Rp. 400,000,000 (Legge 1961:237-38).
Regarding the regional complaints about the backwardness of the 
infrastructure , to some extent this complaint was misdirected because most, if 
not all, of the infrastructure operating during the Soekarno era was 
constructed by the Dutch, not by the Independent Republic of Indonesia. It is 
obvious that the outer island regions, due to the lack of infrastructure, were 
economically underdeveloped, but they could not reasonably be immediately 
provided with infrastructure and services equivalent to the scale that already 
existed in Java. The challenge to the central government would not solve the 
problems of lack of infrastructure.
Since the above factors appear to be dubious as explanations for the 
rebellion, it is perhaps more reasonable if the cause of the rebellion is also 
explained in terms of the rivalry within the political elites, particularly intra­
army rivalry over positions in the government and economic wealth. The 
dissident army officers made the outer island regions the base for their 
challenge to the central government. Many of these officers had once held 
positions in the central government or in Java. For example, Col. Zulkifli Lubis 
was once Deputy Chief of Staff of the army, while Col. Kawilarang had been 
Commander of the army in West Java. These army dissidents sought further 
support from dissatisfied civilian leaders who had been excluded from the 
ruling group in the central government. The dissident officers accused the 
government of over-centralization, corruption, neglect of the outer islands and 
claimed that it had been overwhelmed by Communists (Feith and Lev 1963 : 
32, Crouch 1975: 32). Due to this situation many military officers in the outer 
islands engaged in smuggling, claiming that it was done for the welfare of their
26
troops. The conflict between the elite, particularly the military elites of the 
outer islands, and the centre reached its peak when the central government, 
in an attempt to reduce smuggling and to increase revenue from tax on 
international trade, banned barter trade between the outer islands and the 
outside world. The central government also issued a regulation that all 
exporters must present Foreign Exchange certificates (Bukti Ekspor=BE) 
when claiming foreign exchange from the government. In addition, the central 
government adopted a fixed exchange rate policy. Due to these policies the 
political elites in the regions of the outer islands and the military officers who 
engaged in business claimed that they were being robbed by the central 
government (Legge 1961: 241-43). Legge argues that these dissatisfactions 
of the elites with the central government policy were further aggravated by 
the deterioration of the whole economic situation.(Legge 1961: 236). Legge’s 
argument is supported by the fact that the internal Indonesian situation during 
the Korean boom was momentarily calm, at least until 1952, because 
everybody benefited from this event. When the war was over, however, 
disagreements and disputes tended to warm up again, reaching a climax in 
the form of regional rebellion.
Like the experiences of rebellion in West Java, South Sulawesi, and 
Aceh, the PRRI and Permesta rebellion in West Sumatra and North Sulawesi, 
political elites played a crucial role. It seems that whatever the cause of these 
rebellions, whether primarily political or economic or a mixture of both, and 
whatever the demands, whether greater autonomy or change of the central 
government policy, the key political figures, the regional elites and the military 
commanders, acted as the initiators. In other words, the rebellions were not 
spontaneous movements of the people demanding change in government 
policy. The importance of the role of political elites as the initiators was also 
clear from the fact that at that time most Indonesians had little education and 
did not understand the real situation; and moreover the paternalistic
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characteristic of the Indonesian society made the people simply follow their 
leaders or respond to the appeal of the political elites, whether military or 
civilian or a combination of both.
III.3. The Conclusion.
To conclude, I will attempt to relate the points made in chapter II with 
the points made in chapter III. in order to see the relationship between the 
causes of regional rebellion and the problems of national unity. As has been 
argued, the uprisings of the Darul Islam and the PRRI/Permesta were not 
simple manifestations of ethnic conflict between the Javanese of Central and 
East Java against the non-Javanese. In fact, in the case of the Darul Islam 
rebellion, Kartosuwirjo, who proclaimed himself as the Imam of the Indonesian 
Islamic State, was a Javanese born in Cepu, a small city on the borders of 
Central and East Java. Ironically, he led the Sundanese of West Java and 
cooperated with Kahar Muzakar of South Sulawesi, Ibnu Hadjar of Kalimantan 
and Daud Beureu’eh of Aceh. According to van Dijk, the Darul Islam of West 
Java also spread to Central Java and was supported by some Central 
Javanese (C. van Dijk 1981). Like the supporters of the Darul Islam rebellion, 
the PRRI/Permesta also consisted of a mixture of ethnic groups and included 
among its leaders, a Javanese, Prof. Sumitro On the other hand, the 
central government was not a totally Javanese government.
Nor were the two rebellions based solely on an ideological conflict 
between Muslims and an alliance of Non-Muslims and Abangan Javanese. 
As we have seen, Kartosuwirjo’s movement was not based purely on religious 
motives, and indeed contained a strong element of simple banditry. Like 
Kartosuwirjo, Kahar Muzakar in his challenge to the Centre was also not a 
person purely motivated by commitment to Islam. This was indicated by his
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contact with Communists, as pointed out by Harvey (1975). And the PUSA 
leaders' challenge to the central government was in many respects, as argued 
by Sjamsuddin, due to the government tendency to promote the Uleebalang, 
the PUSA's opponents. In the case of the PRRI/Permesta rebellion, it was even 
clearer that it was not an ideological conflict let alone an essentially religious 
conflict between Muslim and Non-Muslim. The PRRI/Permesta side was clearly 
a mixture of Muslim and Non-Muslim. At that time, although the central 
government was dominated by those who maintained that Pancasila was the 
best ideology for the Indonesian people, on the rebels' side there was a dispute 
concerning "what ideals are they fighting for". Feith and Lev noted there were 
many Muslim officers who opposed the use of Islamic ideology, preferring 
Pancasila as the state ideology which was considered more permissive and 
inclusive (Feith and Lev 1963:32-46)
The presence of many different elements with different interests was 
indicated by Col. Dahlan Djambek, the PRRI's Minister of the Interior, in his 
comments to James Mossman in the early days of the PRRI rebellion:
'"Naturally our appeal must be made to fit our audience. For the 
Western powers we stress the very real danger of Communism. 
For the Javanese, we will talk about parliamentary democracy 
and Soekarno corruption; By using these fragmented and 
localized appeals, the leaders of the PRRI expected, as he said 
'to win the combined support of otherwise divergent elements'" 
(James Mossman 1961:56)
From the evidence put forward it is clear that a nation characterized by 
ethnic diversity, ideological differences, regional fragmentation, and economic 
discrepancies between regions as well as by social and economic gaps between
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the elite and the mass, may face formidable problems in maintaining its national 
unity. Such a range of differences and antagonisms may become acute and 
turn into conflict, particularly in a situation beset with economic scarcity. But 
regional rebellion, separation of balkanization are not necessarily the 
consequences of these numerous differences.
Despite the gap between elite and masses, and without denying the 
element of spontaneous rebellion from below in the pre-1965 rebellions, it 
remains true that a major factor in the seriousness of these rebellions was the 
fact that they had the leadership of a significant part of the political elite, an elite 
divided by personal rivalries and among which dissatisfaction with the 
deterioration of the economic situation was widespread. Therefore, to prevent 
national instability, it seems that the most effective programme would be to focus 
initially on the economic betterment of the political elites.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE NEW ORDER SOLUTION
As has been mentioned in the preceding chapter, there have been 
several explanations for the turbulence of the immediate post-independence 
period. In this chapter we will attempt to explain the bewildering contrast with the 
apparent calm of the New Order period.
The years of unrest following independence were marked by military and 
political challenges from many regions, particularly from the outer islands. These 
insurrections were basically a culmination of many factors among which one of 
the most important was elite rivalry and the dissatisfaction of the leading political 
figures with the ruling group in the central government. This elite conflict was 
exacerbated by the deterioration of the whole economic situation, particularly the 
decline of government revenue and the high inflation rate.
During the period following the outbreak of the Korean war in 1950, almost 
all sections of the political elite in the newly established Republic had 
momentarily enjoyed benefits from the high demand for Indonesian raw materials 
such as rubber in the international market. But when the Korean boom was over 
simmering conflict came to the surface again and the situation deteriorated. This 
economic stagnation resulted in a lack of development, particularly in the outer 
island regions, and this automatically led to a loss of respect for the central 
government in the regions. The situation is well described by Mackie when he 
writes:
"As economic conditions deteriorated,the central government 
became increasingly unable to provide financial resources to the 
regional authorities or wield effective sanctions over them, with the 
result they tended to go their own way in either ’bending’ or 
’disregarding’ central government regulations" (J.A.C. Mackie, 1980 
: 675).
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From this point the interdependency between political development and 
economic development is unequivocal. In Indonesia this situation was clear from 
the fact that the failure of the elite to organize an effective common purpose had 
a negative effect on the economic situation?, while economic deterioration 
sharpened the existing conflict.
In this chapter therefore, I will first examine the New Order political 
approach. This will lead to a discussion of economic development programs and 
their implementation as an overall policy for maintaining stability and unity.
IV.1. The Elites of the New Order.
Since the subject of "elite" has been raised in the previous discussion,it 
will be necessary to define the concept and to examine, based on the works of a 
number of scholars, the role of the elite and particularly its relationship with the 
masses.
The concept and definition of elite is very complex and has been studied 
by many. In this thesis I would like to highlight mainly the discussion of elite 
proposed by Bottomore, since I consider his discussion to be compatible with the 
role of Indonesia’s elite.
7.Phillip M.Hauser in "Structural and Personal Characteristics of the 
less developed areas", (Political Development and Social Change, p.61) 
states that in the societies of South and Southeast Asia, "The 
achievement of collective consciousness and the ability to act in a 
concerted and a team manner toward common objectives may be 
prerequisites to economic development in this part of the world". 
Mohamad Sadli in "Reflections on Boeke's theory of Dualistic 
Economies,(The Economy of Indonesia, Selected Readings), ed by Bruce 
Glassburner, also states the importance of the elite's common perception 
toward the success of development. (Ithaca, N.Y. Cornell University 
Press, 1971), p.120
According to Bottomore, the first social theorist to offer a systematic 
discussion of the concept of elite is Gaetano Mosca. Mosca clearly emphasised 
that any society has two major groups; the "governing elites" and the "ruled 
masses" (Bottomore 1964 : 9). The differences between the two groups, 
according to Mosca, are;
"The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political 
functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that 
power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is 
directed and controlled by the first in a manner that is now more or 
less legal, now more or less arbitrary and violent" (Mosca G, 1939, 
quoted in Bottomore 1964 : 9).
Bottomore added that Mosca elaborated on the characteristics of the elite and 
the dynamic relationship between the elite and the masses. The member of the 
elite try not only to elevate themselves above the rest of the society, they also try 
to maintain their status vis a vis the general masses through a ’sub-elite’ which 
consists of a large group of "the whole new middle class, civil servants, 
managers, white collar workers, scientists and engineers, scholars and 
intellectuals" (Bottomore 1964: 9). This sub-elite also supplies new recruits for 
the elite and plays a vital role in all affairs of the society.
Bottomore also discussed the theory of Vilfredo Pareto. According to 
Bottomore, Pareto further specified the general classification offered by Mosca. 
Pareto said that the elite, the highest stratum in society, should be divided into a) 
the governing elite consisting of those who are directly or indirectly involved in 
the government, and b) a non-governing elite composed of the rest of the elite 
(Bottomore 1964 : 7-8).
The concept of elite which is discussed by Bottomore based on the works 
of many scholars, is in many respects similar to the nature and characteristics of 
the people who are regarded as elite in Indonesia. Benedict R. O’G. 
Anderson specifically pointed out that Indonesian culture tends to divide society 
sharply into elite and mass. A person is either a leader (pemimpin) or one of the
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common people (oranq biasal (Anderson B. R. O’G 1970 : 50). In this study, the 
term "elite" will be attributed to those members of the community who are 
compatible with the criteria put forward by Mosca and Pareto. That is we will 
distinguish between the governing elite, the non-governing elite, the sub-elite and 
the masses. The use of the concepts of Mosca and Pareto in this thesis, I 
consider, in some aspects is in line with the reality that Indonesian society is 
divided into these class communities.
In this context, the Indonesian governing elite is composed of, high 
government officials both military and civilian. The non-governing elite consists of 
prominent figures in society, including leaders of political parties, leaders of 
religious institutions, successful businessmen, and traditional elite. Other 
members of the elite are those who shape public opinion by their public 
statements through newspapers or other mass media. Many of these are 
intellectuals and come from academic institutions, such as scientists, scholars or 
engineers. In regard to successful businessmen, it is important to note that many 
of them were successful due to patronage from high officials in the government, 
while some are in fact high government officers themselves (Crouch 1976, 
Robison R. 1984). The traditional elites consist of those who are respected by 
the people not because they entered into government or the bureaucracy, but 
because they inherited the position from their ancestors in the colonial period.
The elites in both the government and non- government sectors mostly 
belong to the urban based society who are cut off from the rural-based traditional 
mass population. It is typical of elites in Indonesia that there has often been a 
struggle among them to use the masses for their own political purposes. Another 
important characteristic of these elites in Indonesia is that they are basically 
"paternalistic" in the manner in which they limit subordinate opinion or popular
participation, tend to ignore popular demands, and expect the masses to obey 
their authority.
IV.2. Political Approach
Set against bitter experiences during the past and the numerous factors 
which inhibited Indonesian national unity, few observers of Indonesian politics 
would have dared in the late 1960s to suggest that the New Order government 
could maintain a long-standing political stability. Many of them even expected 
that after the abortive coup on 30 September 1965, there might be a succession 
of coups and counter- coups (Crouch 1980, Feith 1980).
There are indeed many aspects to be assessed in analysing the process 
of creating a strong central government and political stability in the New Order 
era. As I have argued, the political upheavals during the previous regime did not 
primarily spring from horizontal cleavages or as Mackie put it, " centrifugal and 
centripetal factors" (Mackie 1980). It was mainly due to the rivalries among the 
political elite. Therefore, the New Order leadership stressed the need for elite 
unity in maintaining a strong central government. In other words political stability 
can be maintained in the long term as long as there is cohesiveness among the 
leading political figures. Gregory has clearly stated that integration of the elites 
has a great impact on increasing political stability (Ann Gregory 1979). The more 
consolidated the elite, the easier it is for the top leader to control it.
There are many factors which contribute to this process of elite unification, 
and the New Order leader has consistently harnessed these factors during his
presidency and at the same time has been able to diffuse those elements that 
could be obstacles to this process.
The most important factor contributing to this elite cohesiveness is the 
patrimonial characteristic of Indonesian society which is prominent not only 
among the Javanese but also in the societies of the outer islands. In a 
patrimonial society there is a distinction between the elite and the masses. The 
masses on the whole, only have responsibilities with limited rights, while the 
elite tends to have more rights than responsibilities to the state. The obligation of 
the masses to the state is in effect their obligation to the government which also 
means their obligation to the rulers. One way or another, the masses have to 
adjust themselves to the elite’s policies whether they agree with them or not. 
Any disobedience of the masses is therefore regarded as challenging the rulers. 
The elite, as the rulers in maintaining their status and authority, tends to become 
more united against the masses although not always united among themselves, 
and to enforce authority they never hesitate to use power and coercion.
The characteristics of patrimonialism have been more apparent under the 
New Order than under the previous regime. Although Indonesia has to some 
extent undergone social and economic changes, it has continued to maintain 
the basic characteristics of a traditional patrimonial state, in which the political 
agenda is developed in terms of personal relationships between patron and 
client, where both the patrons and the clients are drawn from the elite. Thus the 
political game is exclusively played by a small group of people, while the masses 
are almost always cast in the role of onlookers who watch the game outside the 
field of play. In other words the masses are practically depoliticized. In this 
situation the increasingly complex and powerful political structure developed by 
the New Order is harnessed to the needs of individual officials, or of certain 
clients and political factions in order to gain their personal loyalty, rather than to
the common goals of the society.(Crouch 1979, Robison 1980, Nawawi 1980). 
Further, Crouch noted that in this patrimonial state, the ruler maintains his power 
by his capacity to win and retain the allegiance of his supporters by co-option and 
coercion. If the ruler for other reasons cannot use coercion then he tries to retain 
his supporters’ loyalty by providing them with increased benefits, usually material 
wealth (Crouch 1979). Indeed personal loyalty combined with the complex 
structure of the polity and the distribution of material benefits has in practice 
become a trademark of the New Order. These characteristics are not only found 
in the political process in the centre but are extended all over Indonesia.
Another factor that has an important contribution to make to the creation of 
a strong government and political stability is the nature of elite integration: 
integration amongst the elite is stronger than integration between the elites and 
the masses (Gregory 1979). Thus dissident members of the elite are usually 
unable to gain widespread popular support for challenges to the ruling group, as 
in the cases of Gen. Dharsono, Gen. Kemal Idris and Gen.Soemitro, to name 
some who have attempted such a challenge. They were not able to gain any 
mass support although they had won the sympathy of sections of the middle 
class. In contrast to earlier periods, in the New Order almost all high officials 
had bureaucratic or military backgrounds and were therefore unlike party 
politicians who had their own mass supporters.
In its goal of elite integration, the New Order leadership has not been 
exclusively limited to the Javanese elite but has also included the outer island 
elites. Neither has it been limited to armed forces’ officers but it has also 
involved civilian elites. However, as noted by Gregory, the New Order ruling 
group has predominantly consisted of Javanese army officers, particularly those 
from Central Java (Ann Gregory 1977) and so has a strong basis for cohesion.
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The first step of the leadership of the New Order in creating a strong 
government and maintaining political stability was to unite and integrate the 
army elite. This was an important move since the army is the dominant political 
force in the New Order government. The army officers are regarded as part of the 
political elite because, as observed by Crouch, since the revolutionary period the 
army has regarded itself not only as military force but also as a political force 
(Crouch 1978). The army leaders apparently realized that consolidation within 
the army itself was necessary for the creation of a strong government, bearing in 
mind the fact that in the Guided Democracy period the army had been unable to 
gain a dominant position because of lack of political unity (Lev 1966 :71f and 191, 
Pauker 1962:219).
The initial move toward armed forces unification with the army pre­
eminent, was to reorganize the structure of these armed forces . This 
reorganization was crucial because in the past the structure of the armed forces 
had contributed to antagonism and fragmentation within the army (Sundhaussen 
1971/1972 :185-187). Indeed the idea of military consolidation through 
rationalization of the armed forces under a single command was not new. Shortly 
after independence, Gen. Nasution had proposed the concept of an overall 
strategy which would eliminate the possibility of each small unit of command 
being able to take its own initiatives (David Jenkins 1984:222).
The most important step in this process was the elimination of the 
separate ministries for the army, navy, airforce and police force, and the 
consolidation of all forces under the Department of Defence and Security 
(Departemen Pertahanan dan Keamanan -Hankam) The position of Commander 
of the Armed forces was always in the hands of the army, thus giving 
organizational ascendancy to the army over the navy, the air force and the police 
force (Ward 1973 :30). As a result, automatically all officers from all forces were
united under one command. Through this new structure the New Order created a 
strong central support for the regime.This policy apparently was intended to 
prevent future coups from within the army; through the Department of Defence 
and Security the New Order leader can easily control and apply a "tour of duty" 
policy to all military officers.
Having consolidated their control of the armed forces, the army developed 
the concept of Wawasan Nusantara. This concept originated from the doctrine of 
Hankamnas (National Security Defence or Pertahanan Keamanan Nasional) 
dating from the early period of Guided Democracy, which proposed the 
establishment of an effective military command system supported by a 
centralized political order. The Wawasan Nusantara concept is the idea of 
unification of the nation as a total organism which embraces all territories 
throughout Indonesia and all resources and socio-political components existing 
within those territories, enabling it to withstand effectively, in an autarkic 
fashion,any internal and external threat (McVey 1971,1972. Sundhaussen 1978). 
As a result of the reorganization of the Department of Defence and Security and 
the concept of Wawasan Nusantara, the appointment of regional commanders or 
Panglima Daerah Militer (Pangdam) is undertaken by the Department of Defence 
and Security. The responsibilities of regional commanders are not limited to 
military affairs but automatically, in accordance with the concept of total security 
and national defence, and of national resilience, also include political and social 
affairs. However it is also important to note that the involvement of the armed 
forces in civilian affairs was made possible through the concept of "dual function" 
which stated that the army does not limit its responsibility exclusively to military 
affairs but also covers all aspects of economic and social life. The commanders 
of regional territories cooperated with the Governor or Kepala Daerah in every 
province, down to the city, regency and even the village level, the army 
supervised and coordinated every activity of society in line with their task of
maintaining stability and preserving security. The officers of Kodams (Territorial 
military commands) are supposed to supervise their civilian counterparts (Crouch 
1978 :222, David Jenkins 1984:43) although by the 1980s civilian authorities had 
become stronger. Thus in some aspects "cooperation" between military and the 
civilian groups can be regarded as subordination of the civilians by the military. 
With this new organizational structure of the armed forces, and the development 
of the concept of total national security and defence , the leadership of the New 
Order government has been able to unite both military and civilians forces under 
the command of the army. The system has also given massive power to the 
central government to control all activities in all regions in Indonesia.
The initiative in creating a sense of unity among armed forces officers, 
particularly between army officers from outer island regions and the Javanese, 
which is necessary for maintaining political stability, had indeed already been 
taken in the early New Order period during 1966-1967. This action was taken by 
General Ali Murtopo who at that time was Head of Opsus(Special Operation-or 
Operasi Khusus). Almost all army officers who had taken part in the 
PRRI/Permesta rebellion, such as Col.Maludin Simbolon, Lt.Col. H.N.V. Sumual 
and Lt. Col. Ahmad Husein, were released. Even the civilian rebels such as Moh. 
Natsir and Burhanuddin Harahap, both former Prime Ministers in the 
Parliamentary Democracy period, were also set free (Jenkins 1984:58). The 
release of army officers who originated from the outer island regions apparently 
strengthened the solidarity among the army officers from two different periods. 
They all shared the common feeling of being anti-Soekarno and anti-Communist. 
The success of this strategy has to some extent shown that the military elites, 
unlike the civilians, is relatively easily united. They are united not only because of 
their commitment to Pancasila as the state ideology but also because they share 
a feeling of solidarity and are united by their ’esprit de corps’.
According to Sundhaussen, however, the consolidation of the armed 
forces into a single command under the army was the result of a gradual process 
which had been gathering momentum since the revolutionary period. Many 
challenges to the army, including the Madiun rebellion and the Darul Islam 
rebellion, as well as the PRRI/Permesta, were part of this gradual process that 
has contributed to the strengthening of army cohesion, reaching a peak after the 
abortive coup on 30 September 1965 which led to the total restructuring of the 
armed forces with the army as the leader (Sundhaussen 1971).
In the New Order period where the government is dominated by the 
army,attempts have also been made to create a sense of unity among civil 
servants. Civil servants have been united not only through their loyalty to 
Pancasila but also through the creation of the Corps of Civil Servant of the 
Republic of Indonesia (the Korps Peaawai Neaeri Republik Indonesia or more 
popularly known as KORPRI) with its own oath which is called The "Loyalty Oath 
of the Civil Servant (Sumpah Setia Peaawai Neaeri Republik Indonesia). The 
government has deliberately set out to create an ’esprit de corps’ among civil 
servants and to unite them in response to the challenge from the political parties 
as well as to dissuade them from holding dual loyalties.
The consolidation of power in the New Order period, therefore, was not 
only exclusively within the military elite but also included civilian elites. The New 
Order leader united them through the goal of "modernisasi", implying economic 
development and strengthening of national unity (Crouch 1971). The New Order 
leadership apparently fully recognized that the people of Indonesia had suffered 
for long from economic and political corruption, and that development of the 
economy was the only remedy. The economic development program was thus 
not only intended to rescue the nation’s economy but it was also a political 
strategy to win popular support. The civilian elite was included in the New Order
not only because the government realized that they were needed to execute 
development plans, but also because the inclusion of the civilian elite was an 
integral part of "modernisasi" It was a part of the process of strengthening 
national unity; according to Ali Murtopo, political stability and the strengthening of 
national unity are integral parts of "modernisasi" and are prerequisites for 
development in line with the formulated policy (Ali Murtopo 1971)
Military-civilian integration in the New Order era initially took place 
between the dominant officials in the government and the "technocrats", mostly 
from the University of Indonesia, but was later expanded to bring in professionals 
from other institutions. These technocrats, who were mainly economists, had 
been a ’group’ from some time before General Soeharto took over the 
government from Sukarno. Many of these civilians did not acquire elite status due 
to their appointment by the New Order leader into high positions in the 
bureaucracy, as almost all of them originated from modern, educated families of 
businessmen, politicians and gentry, and were already part of the non-governing 
elite. They shared a commitment to principles of economic rationality and the 
goals of modernization through development (MacDougai 1975:398) Many of the 
technocrats and other prominent civilians in the field of tertiary education during 
the Sukarno regime were lecturers at the Staff and Command School for the 
Army or SESKOAD (Sekolah Staff Komando Anqkatan Darat) and other Army 
educational institutions, such as the National Institution for Defence or 
Lemhanas (Lembaaa Pertahanan Nasional). where they built close relationships 
with army officers. Besides, they had also looked to the army for protection from 
the Sukarnoists and the Communists when they had been under attack due to 
their Western educational background (McDougal 1975).
The New Order leader needed the support of the educated elite, not only 
to convince the people of the government’s commitment to development but also
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as a means of gaining support for its development efforts from the free world, 
particularly from the western countries who was reluctant to provide capital 
unless its management was entrusted to properly trained technocrats. Some of 
these technocrats were later promoted as Ministers in the Cabinet, such as Prof. 
Dr. Widjojo, Prof. Dr. Sadli Prof. Dr. Ali Wardhana Drs. Radius Prawiro who are 
all Javanese, Dr. Emil Salim who originated from West Sumatra, and Drs. Frans 
Seda, a Timorese who led the Ministry of Finance during the first years of the 
New Order government, although he was also one of the ministers in the Old 
Order period.
Since this integration was not only intended to promote the goals of 
modernization but also to strengthen the New Order, it was not exclusively limited 
to the Javanese but also included the civilian elites of the outer island regions, 
provided they shared the commitment to the Pancasila (Five Principles of Life) as 
the only state ideology for the Indonesian people. On the other hand this strategy 
for integration gradually excluded members of political parties whether drawn 
from the Javanese or outer island regional elites.
Although parties were included in the early New Order cabinets, they were 
completely excluded in the mid - 1970s. The recruitment of the outer island 
regions’ elite into the consolidated forces of the New Order government was 
initially restricted on the whole to those who had already been "centralized”; that 
is to members of the outer island regions’ elite who had for long been educated, 
and pursued their careers, in JavaS. The members of this elite had mainly 
studied in Jakarta or in Bandung, because these two cities provided a wide range 
of educational institutions for both civilians and the military, particularly the Army.
8. It is understandable that those who were recruited into the 
bureaucracy were mainly educated in Java or overseas because higher 
educational institution were largely limited only in Java. Indeed the 
lack of educational infrastructure, was one of the reasons why the 
outer island regional people complained to the central government in 
Java.
For example, the University of Indonesia in Jakarta is regarded as possessing 
the best Faculty of Economics and the leading Medical school in Indonesia, while 
Bandung has the best Institute of Technology. An important military academy, 
formerly the Technical Academy for the Army or (ATEKAD : Akademi Teknik 
Anqkatan Darat), was in Bandung before it was merged with the Military 
Academy in Magelang, and many army educational institutions are still situated in 
Bandung, ranging from the training centre for first - year soldiers to the staff 
college for the generals, (SESKOAD :Sekolah Staff Anqkatan Darat).
During the process of education and career development, the elites of the 
outer island regions had close contacts and strong relationships with their 
Javanese colleagues. They were brought together by their university education or 
by their training in other institutions. They returned home very rarely, unless they 
were appointed to hold an important position in their own region. Due to their long 
period of stay in Jakarta or in Bandung and their personal relationships with 
Javanese, both military and civilian, to some extent they were not only 
"centralized" but had also become partially "javanized". For example, according 
to some sources, although Drs. Harun Zain, the former governor of West 
Sumatra, remains very much Minangkabau, he has spent many years studying 
and working in Jakarta, and has therefore adopted a "centre" outlook. The 
tendency for the members of the outer island regional elites to become 
"centralized" is clearly observed by Gregory who writes:
" Only five out of twenty three elites of the outer island regions 
in the New Order have close relations with their home, and even 
most of them have been javanized" (Gregory, Ann 1977 :14).
As a result the process of consolidation between those from Java and the 
outer island regions is no longer a process of overcoming ethnic or ideological 
differences but a strengthening existing cohesion. Once President Soeharto felt 
confident that all power, especially elite power, was united cohesively under his
control and that he had been able to develop a strong government, at least at the 
centre, he proceeded to unite regional elites with the centre. These elites were 
needed as mediators between the central government and the regional people to 
guarantee that the central government’s policies would be properly executed in 
the regions and to strengthen national unity. The members of the regional elites 
who served as mediators between the ruler in the centre and the ruled in the 
regions, according to Mosca, served also as the brokers, who transmit, 
communicate and mediate the decisions of the ruler to the ruled (Mosca G.1939).
As a result of this elite consolidation policy, the Governors or Kepala 
Daerah in the outer island regions have been in effect ’centralized’ or at least act 
on behalf of the central government rather than their own regional people. For 
example, in West Sumatra, the region which was once used by military 
dissidents as their regional base in their challenge to the central government, the 
governors are always recruited from members of the elite who have been 
centralized. For example, a former Governor of West Sumatra, Drs. Harun Zain, 
before his appointment as governor was a member of the Golkar Advisory 
Board in Jakarta (David Jenkins 1984) and had been a lecturer at the University 
of Indonesia. The next Governor, Ir. Aswar Anas, was educated at the Bandung 
Institute of Technology and then pursued his career in the Army, where he was 
appointed as the director of the Army Industrial Centre or PINDAD (Pusat Industri 
Anqkatan Darat) in Bandung.
These governors served as the central government’s chief executive in the 
region concerned; this meant that their role as central government agent was 
more important than their role as leader of the local people. The governor, rather 
than being a ’champion’ of the region, must transmit, communicate and mediate 
central government policy and rules.
The role of a governor in the region is also shaped by the way he is appointed by 
the central government. According to Law No 5 of 1974, although the governor is 
elected by the Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakvat 
Dae rah or DPRD) on behalf of all regional people, the appointment has to be 
approved by the Minister of Home Affairs and legitimized by the President. If 
among the proposed candidates there is no one approved by the central 
government, then it, through the Minister of Home Affairs, can appoint one new 
candidate (Seda, 1976: 6). By appointing their own men as governors, the 
central government, through them can control the regions and execute planned 
policy. According Kuntjoroyakti the appointment of the governors has been 
based on the conceptual framework of a "unitary state" (Kesatuan dan 
Persatuan) and has no consideration for decentralization and autonomy 
(Kuntjoroyakti D. 1981 : 144). So with this policy the New Order has been able to 
create a stronger central government than that of the Old Order regime, and has 
gained tighter control of the regions
As stated earlier, in addition to uniting the military and civilian elites of both 
Java and the outer island regions under the theme of "modernisasi" and 
Pancasila as the single state ideology, the New Order government at the same 
time also eliminated any obstacles to the consolidation of New Order forces. The 
acceptance of Pancasila as the ideology of the state was essential, since in the 
past it was Pancasila that had always been used as the bench-mark in any 
conflict among political elites. One measure aiming to eliminate obstacles to elite 
integration was the policy of simplifying the political parties.
As is widely known, in the old order period it was the political parties 
which became the major sources of support for dissidence against the central 
government; therefore it is quite understandable that in the New Order Period the 
political parties’ power was reduced to a minimum. In the early New Order period
the government reduced the number of political parties to nine. Later, a further 
simplification reduced the number to two i.e. a Muslim party, the United 
Development Party or (Partai Persatuan Pembanqunan:PPP) and a Non-Muslim 
party, the Indonesian Democratic Party or Partai Demokrasi lndonesia:PDI. This 
fusion of political parties was also part of the control policy of the military rule. In 
addition to curtailing the number of political parties, the New Order government 
also banned political parties from having bases at the village level. This policy 
was fatal to political activity because the "grassroots" of the political parties were 
indeed in the villages whether in Java or in the outer island regions, and in the 
previous period we could see that the grassroots were usually very loyal to their 
party.
Apparently the New Order regime soon realized that the political strategy 
of uniting the elites through loyalty to ideology and the setting up of new 
organizational structures was not sufficient to guarantee permanent stability. The 
loyalty and cohesion of elites or key political figures could only be maintained 
with rewards such as the distribution of positions in the bureaucracy. For those 
who no longer held power, the government provided facilities and privileges in 
the business world which would enable them to gain commercial profits. On the 
other hand in the case of those who refuse to cooperate and continue to launch 
their criticisms and challenges, the regime has never hesitated to suppress them.
This dual strategy of consolidating the political elites by buying their loyalty 
and damping down the critics by offering privileges in business or other 
opportunities to gain material wealth, while at the same time pressing those who 
refuse to cooperate was clearly observed by Jenkins who writes:
"As we have seen, the Suharto government derived much of 
its power from skillful distribution of patronage, and this gave it 
considerable room ’to remind’ those who failed to play by its rules - 
particularly retired military men-that they could be squeezed out 
and left to suffer. It was, said Lt. Gen. Benny Murdani in mid- June,
a denial of government privileges: ’Normally when people retire 
(from the army) they come to us and see what they can get in the 
way of business. And normally people like this get first priority on 
government contracts and tenders. They can make US$ 1-2 million 
on commissions and that sort of thing and put it in the bank and sit 
back for life. So what we have done in this case is tell them to go to 
the bottom of the list’" (David Jenkins 1984:183).
Consolidating power through opportunities and access to material wealth 
was not a new phenomenon in Indonesia. It was not only a continuation of the 
past regime but part of the nature of the traditional patrimonial state inherited 
from the pre-colonial era as described by Crouch:
" Like in the patrimonial state of traditional Java, where 
officials obtained their incomes from benefices rather than salaries, 
army officers were expected to make the most of appointments in 
the bureaucracy and other government agencies which were often 
seen as rewards for earlier loyalty. No one objected if they enriched 
themselves on the side, provided they performed their functions 
effectively". ( Crouch H. 1980: 531)
In this typical atmosphere of the traditional Javanese state, the elite of the 
outer island regions tended to follow the same game, whether for their own 
benefit or for the sake of their region. They realized that they would gain nothing 
if they opposed the ruling group in the central government. For example, 
Gen.Mohammad Jusuf, a member of the regional elite from South Sulawesi, 
during his service as Minister of Industry in the central government, had a crucial 
role in channelling funds and investment to South Sulawesi and so brought this 
region close to the central government (Sundhaussen 1971:209). The people of 
South Sulawesi now have Dr. B.J. Habibie, the Minister for Research, as their 
link to the central government and they also use him as a source of patronage. A 
similar situation also can be seen between West Sumatra and the central
48
government, where many elites originating from this region have been integrated 
with the central government elite, and have become the link between their region 
and the centre (I.A. Achmad 1984)9.
The tendency for the regional elites to follow the political game played by 
the central government elite is to some extent demonstrated by the fact that most 
of the challenges to the ruling group, whether from the military or civilians in the 
New Order era, were not from the outer island regions. The rivalry and conflict 
among the political elites was no longer between military officers in the centre 
with military officers in the regions, instead the elite rivalry mainly took place in 
the centre without involving the regions or the regional elites, and the rivalry 
mostly occurred among the Javanese themselves since they predominate at the
centre“! 0
The policies conducted by the New Order government to create a strong 
government and political stability through elite integration have so far been 
successfully achieved. However this stability may seem to be artificial, in the 
sense that the elites have only been consolidated, individually or as a group, 
because there is control from the military, particularly the army, as the dominant 
element in the government,and because the regime can still buy their loyalty with 
material wealth that can be expected from the continuing process of economic 
development. Yet they are not altogether consolidated as a homogeneous body. 
This stability clearly depends on the continuity of economic development. Thus 
as long as development continues, stability can be maintained.
9. I.A. Achmad in his Ph.D. thesis "West Sumatra and South Sulawesi: two regions in 
their relation to the central government of Indonesia 1949-1979", Monash University 
1984, has described the role of the regional elites of both regions in their relation 
the central government. The people of both regions have gained benefits from theii 
elites in the centre
10. David Jenkins in Soeharto and his Generals has described the 
internal rivalry of the military elite in the Soeharto government. Also 
see "the current data of the Indonesian Military elites" in Indonesia no 
39.1980
IV.3. The Economic Development Approach.
Once General Soeharto was able to overcome the critical period after the 
post-abortive September 30 coup and had consolidated the rising New Order 
forces, particularly the army, the leadership of the New Order quickly embarked 
on various economic stabilization schemes, with the help of the economists and 
professionals who had for so long been linked with it (Arndt.H.W. 1967). The new 
leadership worked out a short term program, an economic stabilization and 
rehabilitation program, which comprised four short-term objectives, halting 
inflation, decontrol, a moratorium on foreign debts, and a new policy toward 
foreign investment (Arndt H.W. 1981: 32).
Having successfully brought the economy back to a relatively normal 
situation, the New Order government soon launched an economic development 
program. The program was manifested in a Five Year Development Plan known 
as Repelita, an acronym of Rencana Pembanqunan Lima Tahun. Through 
Repelita I, the New Order government set up several objectives involving 
economic, political and socio-cultural goals. In setting economic targets, the 
pragmatic New Order leadership accepted the notion that the Indonesian nation 
could only become wealthy through economic development. This view was in 
contrast to Soekarno’s abstract way of thinking; he had believed that Indonesia 
was a rich and fertile country which could make its people prosper without 
anykind of planned development. The new regime, in its economic development 
plan, emphasized the agricultural sector, especially increasing rice production 
toward self- sufficiency in rice. Other economic goals were provision of clothing 
and housing for the people, infrastructure improvement, and expansion of 
employment opportunities as well as spiritual welfare. In addition to increasing
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agricultural production, the plan also introduced a limited import substitution 
program in agro-related sectors with a labour-intensive technology. These 
sectors were intended to provide employment opportunities and create a linkage 
between the industrial and agricultural sectors (Dept, of Information 1970: 11). 
The new regime apparently realized that agricultural products, especially rice, 
were crucial to economic and political stability, not only because the vast 
majority of the Indonesian population live in the rural area but also because rice 
is the main staple of almost the entire population.
In regard to political goals, the first Repelita clearly stated that in 
implementing the development program at both the national and regional levels, 
two principles must be strictly observed. First, the Pancasila, or Five Principles of 
Life, as the state ideology, must be strictly adhered to in any development 
activities. Second, the aims of development are not only economic but must also 
include political, cultural and defence goals in order to strengthen national unity 
(Dept, of Information 1969 vol. I chap. I and IV).
The macro economic plan was set up by the National Development 
Planning Board (Badan Perancanq Pembanaunan Nasional. Bappenas). The 
chairman of Bappenas was responsible directly to the President, who the 
President provided the chairman with authority to control foreign loans to enable 
it to translate sectoral plans into detailed departmental and agency activities. 
Thus the emergence of Bappenas as the pivot of development activities was a 
landmark in the New Order regime’s planning. However, due to the lack of 
relevant and reliable data inherited from the previous regime, the planners were 
deterred from translating the original target into an explicit sectoral growth plan. 
The plan only aimed at a modest rate of growth, an estimated 5 per cent per
year.
As a complement to the pragmatic and modest sectoral target, the plan 
put forward an equally modest development financing scheme to support the 
required capital formation. In table I and table II the sectoral target scheme and a 
summary of the financial plan for Repelita I are presented. On the basis of this 
modest plan and with the support of favourable international economic 
conditions plus inflow of foreign loans and private capital from western countries 
and Japan and as well as strict implementation sustained with force by the 
dominant army government, the New Order regime achieved tremendous 
economic growth particularly considering the chaotic economic situation under 
the previous regime. In this first Repelita, from 1969/70 to 1973/74, economic 
growth was far above 5 per cent per annum. The average growth was 9.4 per 
cent during the period of the plan as shown in table III.
Yet from table III it can also be seen that the growth was much faster in 
various non-agricultural and forestry sectors although the agricultural sector 
grew at an impressive rate of 5.6 per cent per year. Indeed this was the reverse 
of the situation during the Soekarno regime. It must be noted, however, that the 
dramatic increase in the forestry sector and related log exports were included in 
the agricultural sector. In forestry the growth reached 23.5 per cent per year while 
the "logs outside Teakwood" category grew at an even faster rate of 39.3 per 
cent per annum. Log export in that period made "timber" the second major earner 
of foreign exchange after oil, a big jump from US$ 100.6 in 1970 to US$ 725 in 
1974 (Anwar 1976: 67-124, Lauriat and Sacerdoti 1977 : 64-66, Thayar 1979 : 
26-27). In the forestry sector the role of private capital investment, both foreign 
and domestic, was dominant. The forestry industry was typically regarded as the 
most "wide open" field for investment for both domestic and foreign enterprises, 
and it was also the most profitable investment field because there were 
practically no controls on production and export (Tempo 24.5. 75, and 7. 6. 75). 
According to Robison, the New Order government distributed concession rights
in the forestry sector to its civilian and military clients. Among thirty-four 
indigenous enterprises operating in this field, 24 of them were enterprises 
belonging to the military (Robison R 1978).
The dramatic increase in the forestry sector during this period was also 
accompanied by a tremendous increase in the mining, manufacturing and 
construction sectors. Almost all activities in these three sectors were dominated 
by private capital, particularly foreign capital (Silalahi P.R. 1974: 9-24). It is 
understandable that foreign enterprises would lead activities in the mining sectors 
since projects in this field need sophisticated technology and big injections of 
capital. The growth of the mining sector during the period 1969-1973 was 16.1 
per cent per year. The role of construction in boosting economic growth was 
shown by its rate of growth which reached 24.1 per cent per annum. The 
construction sector rose rapidly, particularly infrastructure construction, to some 
extent because this sector had been largely neglected during the Soekarno 
regime. Improvements and new construction were clearly needed to support the 
progress of other economic activities. In the meanwhile manufacturing grew at 
10.6 per cent per year. Apparently the growth of this sector was quick not only 
because it had been stagnant during the Old Order period but also due to the 
political situation. The new regime was forced to immediately try to meet the 
people’s needs for goods from this sector.
From the economic growth achieved in Repelita I, there was no doubt that 
the New Order government had been able to revive the economy. However, 
despite the regime’s plan to use the agricultural sector as a catalyst of economic 
growth, the growth was largely boosted by non-agricultural sectors, such as 
mining, construction, manufacturing and forestry. It is important to note that 
although forestry is part of the agricultural sector, it cannot be included in the 
category of food production. In all these growth sectors, foreign investment and
foreign loans played a major role. Indeed this was apparently a deliberate 
strategy of the New Order regime. Professor Sadli, who later became a minister 
in the cabinet, has stated that the New Order government strategy aimed at 
maximum economic growth through the infusion of large-scale foreign capital and 
technology (Sadli M. 1971: 99-123).
Foreign investment in Indonesia was regulated through the Foreign 
Investment Law or Undang-Undanq Penanaman Modal Asinq. introduced in 
1967, which a year later was followed by the Domestic Investment Law or 
Undang-Undanq Penanaman Modal Dalam Neqeri. In many respects the 
Domestic Investment Law is similar to the Foreign Investment Law in terms of the 
generosity of the concession and allowance provisions which applied to the 
investors. According to Robison as soon as these Laws were announced, foreign 
investors virtually dominated the fields of forestry, mining, import- substitution 
manufacturing and construction. Moreover the domestic companies, which 
operated under the Domestic Investment Law, in practice used capital 
originating from overseas to enlarge their operations. And most of these 
companies, under whichever Law they operated, had high military officials as 
passive partners (Robison R. 1978). As a result there was some public criticism 
of the planners for having encouraged large scale foreign investment and of the 
generals who for personal and political gain have deployed the power of the state 
on behalf of foreign and Chinese business interests (Tempo No.3.1973, Ekspres, 
June 27 and October 3, 1970). However it was very likely that it was not the 
technocratic planners, but the regime itself which had control of the policy. The 
planners were forced to act in terms of the priorities of political interests.
As stated earlier, in many respects political stability can only be 
maintained if the elites are materially happy.The importance of making the high
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military officials financially content was clearly recognized by Arndt in the early 
years of the New Order regime when it had to cut the budget. Arndt writes :
"Even more formidable, and in a sense fundamental, 
were the difficulties of bringing about substantial cuts in government 
spending. For one thing, the triumvirs (Soeharto, the Sultan of 
Djogjakarta and Adam Malik) had here to contend, not merely 
with opposition from private vested interests, but from that of 
powerful groups within the state apparatus, frequently led by 
potential rivals for political power. There were, for instance, obvious 
difficulties following up the eventual ending of ’confrontation’ by a 
substantial cut in military expenditures. Similar issues were raised 
by any attempts to eliminate or reduce government spending 
functions or agencies which were sources of power and privilege, 
even livelihood of politicians and high officials." ( Arndt H.W. 1967: 
134).
Based on the easy success of economic growth during the first Repelita, 
the New Order regime, through its technocrats in the Bappenas, drafted the 
second Repelita which, in many ways, was similar to its predecessor 
(Glassburner 1978a,: 167-69). As we can see in table IV, the main targets were 
in the non-agricultural sector although agriculture was the main contributor to 
the economy.
Throughout Repelita II, the New Order government stressed that the 
growth which has been achieved in Repelita I was to be continued in Repelita II, 
with an increase in the standard of living remaining the main goal, and again "a 
just and prosperous society based on Pancasila" as the final goal. The task of 
strengthening national unity and developing political consciousness always 
accompanied the process of development (Dept, of Information 1974: chap. I).
From the objectives of Repelita II, it is clear that the New Order 
government remained growth oriented. However, in response to criticism 
concerning unequal distribution of national income, lack of employment 
opportunities, sectoral and regional imbalance, and also the economic gap 
between indigenous or pribumi Indonesians and the Chinese, the New Order
regime through Repelita II provided some new priorities in its development 
activities plan. These priorities comprised employment opportunity, the equitable 
distribution of the fruit of development, efforts to correct discrepancies in the 
market structure, acceleration of economic growth in the provinces, 
transmigration and increasing participation of the people in development through 
cooperation, education and other social activities (Dept, of Information 1974 : 18- 
19).
To support the wider planning objectives of Repeiita II the planners 
delineated a state budgetary reallocation scheme as indicated in Table V where 
greater emphasis was placed on programmes such as "Regional and Local 
Developments," "Education," "Health and Family Planning" and "Other". During 
this period the allocations to such sectors as "Industry and Mining" and to a 
lesser degree "Transportation and Communication", "Agriculture and Irrigation" 
and "Electric Power" fell in percentage terms, but since the overall government 
revenues had risen enormously because of the oil price rise, the decline in 
percentage did not reduce their magnitude in absolute terms. In the table we can 
see that "Industry and Mining" was to be allocated around 3.5 per cent of the total 
Repelita II expenditures, compared to the 7.0 percent it received in the Repelita 
I. Interestingly, a substantial portion of the newly acquired resources was moved 
to "Public Enterprises". Many of these enterprises were large-scale capital- 
intensive industrial projects, with a large portion coming under control of various 
public "conglomerates". During Repelita II the Gross Domestic Product was 
expected to increase at a rate 7 to 8 percent or at an average 7.5 per cent per 
year.
From the budget allocations, we can see that the government was willing 
to take steps to reduce public criticism. This could be interpreted as an effort to 
maintain stability and to halt the criticisms that the development policy only
benefited a certain group of people, and that it tended to create sectoral 
imbalance.
To achieve the target of 7.5 per cent per year, the planners apparently 
followed the Keynesian macro economic model, as demonstrated in Table VI. To 
achieve growth at an aggregate level 21.0 percent, capital formation was planned 
to rise from a level of 19.1 per cent in the first year of Repelita II to 22.9 per cent 
of GDP by the end Repelita II. Around 44.1 per cent of the funds was derived 
from budget allocation, while 55.1 per cent come from "Others" i.e. foreign and 
domestic private enterprise investment, plus a small portion of private savings. 
The planners forecast further increases in log and oil exports so a big part of the 
role of foreign aid was reduced. As indicated in table VI, foreign aid declined from 
34.7 per cent of total government investment in the 1974/75 budget to only 17.8 
per cent in 1978/79, although in absolute terms it remained more or less at the 
same level. The overall level of 24.2 per cent was achieved by supplementation 
from government savings.
It is clear from table VI that the allocated budget expenditure for the "non­
economic" and agricultural sector, which is presented in Table V, still remained 
well below the combined funding for "non-agriculture" and "non-social" 
development expenditure, plus the expected increase in foreign and domestic 
private investments. This is particularly clear if we include in the calculation the 
fact that the greater portion of foreign aid was usually slated to finance the "non­
agriculture" and "non-social" sectors, with only a small portion directed for 
irrigation schemes in the agricultural sector. Furthermore, no fundamental 
structural transformation strategy was delineated to sustain the development 
budget reallocation scheme.
The regime, in Repeiita II, was confronted with the problem of correcting 
the sectoral imbalance from the first Repeiita which was intertwined with the 
problem of income distribution. Rather than formulate a fundamental strategy to 
correct the above problems, the government opted for an elaborate Keynesian 
plan for increasing employment opportunities. In the second Repeiita, the 
government planned to create around 5.5 million new jobs over the period of five 
years, about half in the agricultural sector, and approximately 1.2 million in 
manufacturing, 0.3 million in construction, and the rest in the service and others 
sectors (Dept.of Information 1974). With the objective of job creation the 
government clearly had to plan investment of a high labour-intensive type (Tang 
and Yong 1975: 57). This policy perhaps was also intended to dampen down the 
criticism of the capital-intensive investment during the Repeiita I, which had not 
created prosperity for the poor or the vast majority of the population.
Again with the help of the oil boom in particular, log exports in the second 
half of 1970s, and the continuing flow of foreign investment and loans from the 
Inter Government Group for Indonesia (IGGI) countries, as well as the rise of 
domestic capital, the New Order regime was able to maintain the success which 
had been achieved in the first Repeiita. Thus during the first and the second 
Repelitas, economic growth was able to surpass population and labour force 
growth by a substantial margin. Between the 1971 Population Census and the 
1976 Intercensal Population Survey, GDP grew at 8.3 per cent per annum while 
population grew at 2.0 percent and the labour force at 4.7 percent per annum. As 
a result, GDP per capita had risen rapidly from a low level of Rp30,796.8 (US$ 
94.8) at current prices in 1971 to Rp118,924 (US$ 286.6) at current price in 1976. 
Such macro indicators indicated that both plans could be considered successful. 
A comparative analysis with the rest of the Third World outside the capital- 
surplus OPEC nations, and in particular with ASEAN nations, further strengthens 
this conviction (Wong J. 1979).
As stated earlier, the growth was largely supported by revenue from oil. 
During that period Indonesian oil in the world market rose from the F.O.B price of 
$2.93 per barrel in April 1973 to $ 4.75 per barrel in October 1973, and then in 
January 1974, at the beginning of Repelita II, it more than doubled to $10.80 
per barrel. In June 1974 the price had reached $12.50; thus within one year the 
oil price rose by more than 400 per cent. This more than doubled Indonesia’s 
export earnings, and government revenue rose by more than 100 per cent (Arndt 
H.W 1984: 61-72 and 244-251). This windfall profit from oil was almost beyond 
grasp. Although the government to some extent succeeded in raising the level of 
welfare of those in poverty it was not able to close the income gap between the 
small elite and the vast majority of the Indonesian people. Instead it appears 
that the gap has grown wider and a new, small group of rich people was created 
(Tempo 17 January 1976,and Tempo no 39 year XVI, 1986). This tendency was 
indirectly demonstrated in Table VII, showing the realization of Repelita II. From 
the table we can see that, again, the outcome of Repelita II was similar to that of 
Repelita I. Although the GDP growth rate surpassed the target of 7.5 per cent, 
the non-agriculture sector grew much faster than the agriculture sector. The rate 
of increase in agriculture, on which the vast majority of the Indonesian people 
rely for their living, hardly reached 3.0 per cent and was much below what had 
been achieved in the Repelita I, i.e 5.6 per cent. On the other hand the non- 
agricultural sectors, which are mainly controlled by a small group of state and 
private conglomerates, grew at more than 13 per cent on average; construction 
grew by 15.22 per cent per annum, transportation and communication 15.14 per 
cent, and electricity 13.48 per cent. The rapid growth of these sectors was not 
only due to private capital injection but was also sustained by huge government 
expenditure derived from oil revenue.
The central government increased its routine and development 
expenditure during the period of the oil bonanza. In the budget 1974/75 the basic 
salaries of public servants were increased three times, while for special 
categories of public servants such as school teacher and public health 
employees, salaries were increased five times. Further, in the 1975/76 budget, 
there had been another increase in salaries of public servants, so that the basic 
salary of government employees had risen 9 times from 1969/70.By increasing 
the salaries of government employees, however, this programme only directly 
raised the incomes of the less than 3 millions government employees in 1977 ( 
Dept, of Information 1979). Moreover, since most civil servants live in urban 
areas, this government expenditure only had a significant impact on the urban 
economy, while on the other hand the vast majority of the Indonesian population 
who live in rural areas only benefited from the slight spill-over effect of this rising 
routine expenditure on government salaries. Another increase of government 
expenditures as the result of the oil boom was for regional development and 
INPRES programs. It is quite understandable that the Government raised its 
spending for regional development since almost the entire oil revenue was 
derived from exploration in the outer island regions. However such expenditure 
still could not help solve the existing inequality of income distribution
In both these Repelitas, there was no doubt that the main effort of the 
New Order government was to increase the role of agriculture in its economic 
development program as indicated by its expenditure in this sector. However in 
fact, it was oil that became the catalyst of the economy. In the immediate period 
of the oil bonanza, in the mid 1970s, the government raised its expenditure for 
agriculture and irrigation by almost 80 percent compared to the period in the 
Repelita I (Arndt H.W. 1984: 65), As a result, during these two Repelita periods, 
the government was able to keep rice imports, particularly from Thailand and 
other Asian countries, down to a very low figure; up until the fiscal year 1980/81
the government only imported 0.5 million tons (Arndt H.W. 1984: 265). However 
the increased expenditure on agriculture did not have the same effect as it had 
on non-agriculture. Despite its large contribution to total GDP, its contribution to 
the increase of GDP was not very high if compared to the non-agricultural 
sectors. On the other hand the rapid growth in the non-agricultural sector had not 
only boosted the increase in GDP but to some extent brought a structural change 
to the Indonesian economy, moving from traditional agriculture toward 
industrialization.
It was perhaps due to the recognition that the fruits of development so far 
had not been well distributed, or possibly because the regime considered that the 
political situation was now more favourable that in Repelita III, that the New 
Order regime stressed the goal of more even distribution of the benefits of 
development, beside the goal of high overall economic growth, as well as the 
goal of stability. The goals were introduced in the so called "development trilogy" 
which comprised; 1) the target of more even distribution of the benefits of 
development in order to achieve "social justice for the entire population", 2) the 
target to achieve a high overall growth rate, 3) the target toward a healthy and 
dynamic national stability.
In order to achieve "social justice for the entire population," the first goal 
of the trilogy, the New Order government adopted eight targets which were 
known as " eight paths of equality" (Delapan Jalur Pemerataan). as follows
1) equality toward fulfilment of basic needs for the entire population, mainly 
the needs of food, clothing and housing.
2) equality in gaining education and health service.
3) equality toward income distribution.
4) equality in gaining job opportunity
5) equality in business
6) equality in development participation, particularly for the young generation
and women.
7) equality in development distribution throughout the country.
8) equality in gaining justice.
(Dept of Information, Republic of Indonesia 1979 :19-21).
The targets of Repelita III, as shown in Table VIII, indicated a lower 
projection in every sector compared with the previous Repelitas, and a 
particularly sharp drop was shown in the sector of mining. Even this target was 
regarded by many economists as optimistic as much would depend in part on 
the international economic situation and the prospect of world economic growth, 
particularly in the OECD countries(Arndt H.W. 1984, p.254). The planned targets 
in Repelita III showed that the government did not expect as high a growth rate 
as had been achieved in the previous Repelitas. Economic growth was expected 
to reach an average of 6.5 percent per year as compared to 7.6 percent during 
the period 1973/74 to 1977/78. Considering that in Repelita III the emphasis was 
put on equity, a low target could be interpreted as a sign of compromise between 
the growth and equity objectives.
Despite the uncertainty of the international economic situation and the 
stated government objective of a more even distribution of development in every 
sector, President Soeharto, in his state address on 15 August 1981, introduced a 
revised estimate in which growth in 1981 was estimated to have increased in 
real terms by 9.6 per cent. Such growth was to be sustained by 21 percent 
growth in manufacturing, around 10 percent in trade and transport, and 14 
percent in service, while the agricultural sector was planned to increase by 5.5 
percent (Dept.of Information 1981: 1-34). This new estimates demonstrated that 
the regime’s commitment to achieve growth remained firm.
In the realization of Repelita III, which is shown in Table IX, we can see 
that economic growth was below the targeted 6.5 percent, although, at 6.1 
percent it could be considered high compared to many other developing 
countries in that period (World Bank 1983). The data also indicated that there 
were fluctuations in the annual growth rate. The large oil revenues and a strong 
world economy, which helped boost non-oil exports provided the basis for a 
growth rate at almost 10.0 percent in 1980. On the contrary, the slump in the 
world demand of oil and other Indonesian export commodities had contributed to 
the drop in growth to only 2.3 percent in 1982, and only a slight increase in 1983, 
of 4.2 percent. The growth during 1979 to 1981 was much better than the growth 
in 1982. Apparently this was due to the effect of devaluation in November 1978, 
which helped increase non-oil exports. However in Repelita III the most 
impressive outcome was the rise of rice production which reached 6.5 percent 
per year (Dept.Keuangan 1985: 9).
Overall, as a result of this development policy, despite the world recession 
during that period, Indonesia was able to achieve an excellent economic growth 
record which was rated by international experts and many economist in 1982 as 
the best among developing countries such as Thailand, Singapore, South Korea 
, and other oil exporting countries, like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and many other 
countries (Euromoney Magazine, September 1982). And since 1980 Indonesia 
has been included in the World Bank category of "middle income" countries with 
a per-capita income of over US $430 (World Bank 1980).
However, despite the success of this economic performance and the 
government’s stated objective in Repelita III that development planning would be 
directed toward equal distribution of national income and social justice, as a 
matter of fact inequality persisted as clearly admitted by Emil Salim who wrote :
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"Since Repelita ill Indonesia has tried to pursue a policy of 
development with equity in its industrialization process. Present 
trade patterns and the international economic structure, however, 
are hampering this process....  ( Salim E. 1983: 3).
Moreover, despite the government’s intention to use agriculture as 
catalyst of the Indonesian economic growth, so far economic growth has been 
sustained by the non-agricultural sectors, mainly oil. Indeed, the main 
determinant of the stagnation of the Indonesian economy was the shift in oil 
price,since revenue from oil was the biggest contributor to the state budget and 
was in fact the main engine of economic activities.
As an indication of how crucial the role of oil is to the Indonesian economy, 
Arndt (1984) pointed out that in November 1981 oil revenues accounted for 70 
per cent of total government revenues, exports produced two-thirds of foreign 
exchange earnings, and oil provided 80 percent of domestic energyii (Arndt 
H.W. 1984: 259). The impact of oil on the nation’s economy was also evident 
when Pertamina, the sole, and effectively autonomous state oil enterprise, was 
trapped in 1975 in a huge debt that threatened Indonesia’s credit standing. This 
forced the government to cancel many of its important projects, and in effect 
slowed down the economic development pace, while it also affected political 
stability (Arndt H.W. 1984: 248-251). In relation to the crisis of Pertamina there 
was much criticism that a large percentage of its debt had only enriched a small 
circle of people, rather than improving the welfare of the entire population 
(Tempo no.39, year XVI, November 1986).
Apart from the imbalance between growth of the non-agricultural and 
agricultural sectors, and the dependence on oil, foreign loans and foreign private
11. In 1981 earnings of foreign exchange heavily depended on oil because 
in 1979 and again in 1980 the export of unsawn logs was not only the 
second largest foreign exchange earner of the country but also, 
according to Arndt, made Indonesia the supplier of almost half of the 
world's tropical hardwood needs(Arndt H.W. 1984: 260)
capital to boost the economy, there was no doubt the regime has able to increase 
production of rice during the three Repelitas; certainly rice production was much 
higher than under the previous regime. However the government still faced the 
problem of supplying a steady amount of food in general and rice in particular to 
the entire population, and to overcome this shortfall in food production the 
government still had to import from other countries. For example over the last 
three years of the Repelita III, the government was able to maintain the stock of 
rice at about 2.7 million tons a year, but 2 million tons or 63 percent of the total 
bufferstock was imported (Salim E. 1983 : 3-18). This bufferstock was needed to 
keep the price of rice stable, and within the reach of the lower-class urban 
people. Price maintenance was not only an important policy in checking the 
inflation rate but basically it was essential to preserve political stability because, 
as has been indicated in the past, it was the urban people who in many ways are 
more easily driven toward political unrest.
The pattern of national economic growth which was supported by 
extractive industry, mainly oil and log exports in the first and the second Repelita, 
and then Liquid Natural Gas starting in the second Repelita, as well as 
construction and manufacturing, was clearly reflected in the economic 
development throughout the regions, which will be discussed below.
IV.4. Development and economic growth in the region
In the discussion of development in the regions, particularly regions of the 
outer islands, it is essential to understand the importance of regional economic 
development for the national interest. First, it was lack of development in the 
regions that had been used as the reason for regional challenges during the 
Soekarno period. Second, many important national economic resources are
found in the regions, ranging from perennial crops, forestry, mining, oil, and since 
1976 LNG (liquid natural gas). In recognition of these economic resources, the 
central government clearly considered in the first Repelita that national 
development is virtually identical with regional development because so much 
economic potential was to be found in the regions (Dept, of Information 1970. vol. 
2.chap. 5). Thus economic development in the outer island regions is not only 
fundamental for the achievement of overall national economic goals but also has 
great implications for political stability. According to Esmara, equal regional 
development is not only economically desirable but indeed is crucial to achieve 
the goal of "Bhinneka Tunqgal Ika" or "Diversity in Unity" (Esmara H.1975).
In this regard, there are a number of development activities in the regions 
of the outer island. First, there are development projects which are carried out 
and financed by the central government through the state budget.Second, there 
are development projects which are financed by the central government but 
carried out by the regional government, for example INPRES projects. Thirdly, 
there are development projects which are financed and carried out by private 
enterprise, whether foreign or domestic companies. This involvement of private 
enterprises is in line with the open economy policy which was adopted by the 
New Order government. The implementation of this policy is regulated by the 
Law of Foreign Investment (Undanq Undanq Penanaman Modal Asinq :PMA) 
and the Law of Domestic Investment (Undanq-Undanq Penanaman Modal 
Dalam Neqeri: PMDN). Under these laws the government is supposed to attract 
the investors and to direct their investment, while decision-making to invest or not 
to invest is entirely in the hands of the investor.
Projects which are financed and carried out by the central government are 
known as National Projects. They are sectoral project whether carried out in Java 
or the outer island regions and the implementation is the responsibility of the
Department concerned. For example, road construction projects are the 
responsibility of the Department of Public Works, while Electricity projects are the 
responsibility of the Department of Mining and Energy. A sectoral project is 
considered as a national project because it is both critical for the national interest 
and has "strategic value", which means that the project not only needs a huge 
capital investment but also in some respects it generates a considerable profit, as 
in oil exploration projects. By contrast INPRES projects are financed by the 
central government through the state budget but their implementation is carried 
out by each provincial government which selects local contractors to carry out 
the work. The funds for INPRES project are allocated to each region based on 
regional needs. Thus unlike sectoral projects which are supposed to speed up 
economic growth at both the regional and national levels, the projects under this 
Presidential Instruction are supposed to create equal development in the regions 
(Dept.of Information, Repelita I, II ). From these types of projects it is clear that 
the number of projects and related development activities in each region in many 
respects depend on central government policies, rather than on individual 
regional governments.
This tended sometimes to lead to relative neglect of agriculture in the 
regions. For example, according to Booth, in line with the central government’s 
goal of self sufficiency in rice, the government expanded irrigation facilities and 
improved infrastructure in Java and Madura, but in the outer islands the effort 
was directed toward expansion of the harvested area (Booth A. 1977: 70) 
Furthermore under Repelita I, West Sumatra, which is well known as a rice- 
producing area, the technical quality of irrigation was only adequate to serve less 
than 100,000 hectares of wet rice, which meant it could only serve 45 percent 
of the total available wetrice area in the region. This situation remained 
unchanged until the beginning of Repelita II (Boediono and Hasan 1974, Sumatra 
Barat 1976: 224).
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In the second Repelita, there were some efforts which indicated that the 
central government was beginning to pay more serious attention to improving 
the agricultural situation in the outer island regions. In 1973,in line with the policy 
of increasing production of agricultural commodities, the government planned to 
extend the rubber cultivation area to more than 2.3 million hectares out of a 
total of 5.9 million hectares for all commercial crops, where about four-fifth of 
this acreage had always been in the form of small-holding outside Java (Gwyer 
1974: 35). In the meanwhile in South Sumatra, as the main area of rubber in the 
outer island regions and the largest producer of smallholding rubber, which 
comprised 26 percent of the total rubber-producing area in the country and 
contributed 20 percent to the national total production of rubber, the central 
government introduced the "Village Unit Scheme", "the assisted replanting 
project" and the "nucleus estate" to further modernize this sector (Rahman 1978: 
58 and 82-117).
Despite the extension of the harvested area and the modernization 
programs which were introduced in some regions of the outer islands, however, 
average annual agricultural production remained small. The production of rubber 
in 1974 - 1977 was only 554,000 tons, which was merely equal to production 8 
years before (Indicator Economy, December 1978, : 19-21. Arndt H.W. 1977: 23, 
1978: 14. Glassburner 1978: 12). Besides its policy for rubber, the central 
government since 1973 also introduced an extension program for coconut 
harvested area in South Sulawesi and coffee in South Sumatra where until 1973 
production had only reached 25 percent of pre 1966 levels for coconut and 22 
percent for coffee (Statistical Year Book 1975: 490-491). Here, like for rubber the 
emphasis was not on intensification and improvement but on extension. In North 
Sulawesi, although the coconut acreage was increased, half of the trees were 
over the normal maximum age of fifty years (Boediono 1972 : 71).
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Judging from the disappointing outcomes of these policies for rubber, 
coconut and coffee it would seem that the government had not yet been forced 
to pay proper attention to these programs. Even though these sectors were not 
as profitable as forestry let alone oil exploration, yet they were dominated by 
smallholder producers'^. As a consequence of such government priorities not 
only did development in the agricultural sector lag behind non-agriculture but 
also development in the regions producing such crops lagged behind.
The regions which possessed resources such as oil and natural gas 
were in many respects more fortunate than other regions. Exploration for 
resources apparently encouraged the central government to improve the existing 
infrastructure and if necessary build a new one. For example Aceh13 benefited 
from a significant increased in infrastructure development after 1976, due to 
exploration for natural gas (Sjafrizal and Dawood 1986). Further, the exploration 
for natural gas in Aceh was not only associated with the improvement and 
construction of new infrastructure but also led to the establishment of natural 
gas related industries such as petrochemicals, fertilizers and cement. All these 
industries have raised the economic growth of the region to as high as 13.4
12. This tendency is also clearly indicated by the fact that the 
government only started initiating a serious diversification export 
policy, with emphasis on traditional commodities, after the oil price 
steadily declined.
13. I choose Aceh as the main example because I consider Aceh as the 
most challenging region to the central government from the time of the 
Soekarno regime until present. This was supported by the fact that only 
in the 1987 General Election did Golkar, the party of the government, 
beat the PPP, the opposition party which has a strong base in Aceh. In 
order to beat the PPP in this particular region, the regime had to give 
special treatment to Daud Beureu'eh, the most prominent figure of the 
PPP in Aceh. Daud Beureu'eh had not only been treated with 
extraordinary consideration during the New Order period , but in the 
early years of the New Order he was entertained by the regime with a 
tour around the world and offered a luxury house in an elite suburb in 
Jakarta (Tempo 18 April 1987)
percent per year with the highest increase reached in the period 1975 to 1985. 
As a result, the overall per capita income of Aceh was higher than the average 
national per capita income (Sjafrizal and Dawood 1987: 16). Further, the 
tremendous increase in Aceh’s exports, which grew at a rate of 72 percent 
annually during the period 1977 to 1984, became a clear illustration of the 
importance of LNG to Aceh’s economy; if LNG exports were excluded from the 
Aceh growth calculation, the rate of increase in exports was only 8.4 percent per 
year (Sjafrizal and Dawood 1987: 42).
The policy of the central government to intensify exploration for natural 
resources was not only undertaken in Aceh but also in other rich regions. Esmara 
(1975), has demonstrated that these regions, rich in oil and timber, such as Riau 
and East Kalimantan, have been growing rapidly since 1968. During the first 
Repelita, particularly during 1968 - 1972, the per-capita income of these regions 
was higher than many other regions, although to some extent this was due to the 
spillover of those extractive industries. But even if income from oil and timber 
were excluded, the per-capita income was still high(Esmara H. 1975).
From the above discussion it is clear that the policy of the central 
government in the extractive industries has not only promoted the national 
economy but also that of specific regions because exploration for resources has 
also encouraged the central government to establish other related industries and 
infrastructure that were needed to sustain the development of these industries. 
On the other hand, in the case of many other regions which rely for their 
economy on perennial crops, particularly those produced by smallholders, the 
central government’s policy has so far not yet shown indications of any 
improvement; productivity in the production of many commodities, at least until 
the end of Repelita II, remained as low as it was in the Old Order period.
Besides the policies in the mining and agricultural sector, another central 
government policy which has an intended "developmental effect" on the regions 
of the outer islands has been the transmigration policy. There are quotation 
marks around the word "developmental effect" because this policy was not 
initially designed to help promote the economy of the regions; it was a policy that 
was intended to alleviate the population problem in Java. But since the beginning 
of the first Five Year Development plan, transmigration has been placed in a 
much wider context of regional development. According to Arndt and Sundrum, 
transmigration should be perceived not merely as a policy that was intended to 
promote a better population distribution between Java and the recipient islands, 
in this case the outer island regions, but it was also aimed at ensuring an 
adequate supply of labour for regional development in agriculture. Second, it was 
planned as a catalyst for regional development by using labour from Java. And 
third, this policy also offered to both voluntary and government-sponsored 
migrants opportunities for employment as wage earners rather than smallholders 
(Arndt H.W. and Sundrum 1977 ). However, although the transmigration policy 
was also intended to speed up development in the regions, it has remained a 
central government’s sectoral project in the outer island regions with its funds 
channelled through the Department of Transmigration, and its implementation is 
carried out through inter-departmental cooperation^
Transmigration can be perceived as a system for supplying labour from 
Java to meet the development needs of the outer island regions. These regions
14. During the first Repelita, the Department of Transmigration was 
responsible for all aspects of transmigration until it was later 
transferred to the provincial governments. In the second Repelita, the 
responsibility for transmigration was put under the Directorate General 
of Transmigration under the Department of Manpower-Transmigration and 
Cooperatives assisted by a coordinating body which comprised the 
Department of Public Works, Agriculture, Home Affairs, Finance, Health 
and Education under the program set by Bappenas. Because the role of 
transmigration was crucial to national and regional interests, in March 
197 8 the Department of Transmigration was set up to handle this 
programme, with support from the seven departments
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were economically less developed, not only due to lack of infrastructure, 
transportation, electric power and economic institutions such as banking and 
insurance, but also due to lack of labour. For example, Suratman and Guinnes 
note that much of the labour recruited for rubber and other estates in Sumatra 
came from Java (Suratman and Guinnes 1977: 87). The contribution of migrants 
from Java as labour supply to promote growth, particularly in the agricultural 
sector, was indicated by the expansion of wet rice (sawah) cultivation in many 
provinces in Sumatra. Table X indicates that in southern Sumatra i.e Jambi,South 
Sumatra, Bengkulu and Lampung where the number of transmigrants is greater 
than in northern Sumatra, the harvested area rose at an average of over 4 
percent and production increased by 5 percent annually from 1976 to 1980. In 
the last 30 years, particularly in Lampung and South Sumatra, the main area of 
migrant settlement, the annual growth of rice output has been twice as large as in 
Java. The increase of rice production was not only important to fulfil the New 
Order regime’s objective of self sufficiency in rice but it was also crucial to 
impress the people in the recipient regions of the contribution of transmigration to 
increasing the production in the regions, at least in terms of production of the 
staple food, rice.
In terms of increasing infrastructure facilities in the regions, Arndt clearly 
shows that in Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi, transmigration is associated 
with a great deal of infrastructure investment, such as road, construction, 
irrigation and swamp reclamation (Arndt 1983). Another clear example of road 
construction which is associated with transmigration is the construction of the 
Trans Sumatra Highway. Some critics argued that the highway would never have 
been constructed except for transmigration purposes, while other observers hold 
that this program has only benefited the Javanese settlers and led to the 
creation of Javanese enclaves in the regions of the outer islands (Hardjono J. 
1977).
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Despite the ideal of a planned programme and co-ordinated 
implementation carried out by cooperation among seven departments, in fact 
there has been much criticism of the implementation of this program as 
unorganized, in-efficient and corrupted. (A recent news item stated, that due to 
lack of coordination among departments, lack of capacity and capability of 
personnel, and with many others factors, 6,000 houses for transmigrants were 
wasted and had to be scrapped. The Dept, of Transmigration had already built 
the houses despite no confirmation about the number of transmigrants that would 
require housing. The Minister for Transmigration simply intended to destroy the 
un-used houses (Kompas 2 December 1987, Tempo 16 January 1988)
Notwithstanding the many failures and the funds which have been wasted 
in carrying out this program, the regime has made little attempt to root out the 
cause of the problems. Rather than strictly controlling its implementation, 
reorganizing the institutions which are involved and sacking the officials who are 
responsible for the failures, it continues to increase the allocated budget. For 
example, in the beginning of the first Repelita, the budget allocation for 
transmigration was only 0.7 percent of the total development budget, but in 
1982/83 it had already reached 6.1 percent, while the volume of the 1982/83 
development budget was only twice as big in real terms as the development 
budget for 1969/70. Thus within 12 years the volume of the total development 
budget only rose by 100 percent while that for transmigration had increased by 
almost 900 percent (Nota Keuangan, various years).
From the above discussion, we can see that though the aim in alleviating 
population pressure in Java and sustaining economic development in the outer
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island regions was less than successful, the regime persisted in maintaining the 
implementation of the transmigration program based on the existing policy.
Development activities in the regions of the outer island were largely due 
to the implementation of central government policy or national policy in the 
regions, and carried out in the mining sector, in agriculture and in transmigration 
projects. The only national policy specifically devoted to regional concerns is 
manifested in the Presidential Instruction Projects, known as INPRES Projects, 
which comprise:
1. The village subsidy scheme (Inpres Desa). started in 1969/1970.
2. The district subsidy scheme (Inpres Kabupaten). started in1970/1971.
3. The primary school scheme (Inpres Sekolah Dasar) started in 1973/74.
4. The community health centre scheme (Inpres Puskesmas) started in 
1974/75.
5. The provincial subsidy scheme (Bantuan Dati I) started in 1974/745.
6. The tree planting and reforestration scheme (Inpres penghijauan) 
started in 1976/77 and
7. The market subsidy scheme (Inpres Pasar) which also started in 1976/77. 
(Nota Keuangan various years)15
From the list of "Central Government Subsidies to Regions" we can see 
that these types of subsidy in the first Repelita were increased to seven types by
15. The provincial subsidy or Inpres Dati I was introduced to replace 
the Automatic Foreign Exchange Allocation or Sumbangan Pemerintah 
Pengganti Alokasi Devisa Otomatis:SPP ADO. The fund is allocated to the 
projects in the regions which have been approved by the central 
government. SPP ADO was a subsidy from the central government based on 
the export performance of each region but later this scheme was regarded 
as unfair as not all regions in Indonesia are exporting regions.
the end of the second Repelita. Apparently as a gesture from the central 
government to the regions, particularly the exporting regions, not only the type of 
subsidy had been multiplied but also the magnitude of the subsidies, especially in 
the period of the oil boom, as shown in table XI.
The table also indicates that the elementary school subsidy is the biggest 
of all. This subsidy is distributed to the regions on the basis of the number of the 
children. Therefore, since the number of children that need education is bigger in 
Java than in the outer island regions, consequently the largest percentage of this 
subsidy goes to Java. The Provincial subsidy is the second biggest, not only 
because this subsidy covers the whole of a provincial area but because the 
Provincial subsidy (Bantuan Dati I) was the main policy in the New Order period 
which was initially intended to promote the economy of the regions, particularly 
the outer island regions. This policy was created against the background of 
conflict between the centre and the regions of the outer island over the 
distribution national income in general and of foreign exchange earnings in 
particular.
The provincial subsidy indeed had already been initiated in 1966 under 
the name" Automatic Foreign Exchange Allocation" ( Alokasi Devisa 
Otomatis=ADO) which later in the first Repelita was replaced with "Central 
Government Contribution in Lieu of ADO" (Sumbanqan Pemerintah Penqqanti 
ADOL
The ADO policy was adopted by the central government as a bargaining 
policy with the outer island regions, particularly the exporting regions, following 
hard on the heels of the 1966 Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly 
Decision No. XXXI on the granting of Autonomy in the "real and widest sense" 
(Dalam arti vanq seluas-luas dan sesungquhnva). Further, in 1967 at a
conference of governors in Solo, the regions issued a demand to the central 
government for an annual 30 percent of the total central revenue to be ear­
marked to the regional budget. However, after strong bargaining, the central 
government proposed the ADO scheme as a solution, which also initially was 
intended to revive exports from the regions. Under the ADO scheme the 
exporting regions were automatically given a share of revenue and foreign 
exchange in the form of 10 percent of the export tax on all exports originating 
from their own region with an additional 10 percent for any margin above the 
targeted export, and a 2 percent pro rata allocation for those who were unable to 
reach the target (Penny and Thalib 1967: 7, Seda F. 1976: 61-70).Foreign 
exchange receipts, based on this policy could be used directly to import capital 
goods or consumption goods under the individual regional economic policy. With 
this ADO scheme the central government hoped that the regional governments 
and the people would stop the practice of barter trade or smuggling, which was 
common among the regional traders during the old order period.
However with the further consolidation of military and civilian elites in the 
centre, which provided a strong political power base to the regime,and the 
increasing economic resources of the new government, in the first Repelita the 
ADO scheme was replaced with the "Central Government subsidy in Lieu of 
ADO" or (Sumbangan Pemerintah Penqganti ADO).
The central government maintained that though the scheme (ADO) had 
been effective in reviving exports and ending the regional practice of "non- 
conventional financing", overall it had a highly discriminatory effect. The stronger 
regions, including those which were not necessarily export producing regions but 
which were well endowed with ports and other facilities, gained most from the 
scheme, while the poorest and the most populous regions gained least. It also
intensified undue competition among regions, causing duplication of efforts in 
development and other facilities and to regional prohibitions against the inter­
regional flow of export commodities. It was ostensibly to stop such negative 
trends of regional differentiation, as well as to support the overall program of 
Repelita, that the regime decided to end the ADO scheme ( Hadi 1974 : 63-72, 
Salim 1975: 24). With the SPP ADO, each region received a subsidy equal to its 
ADO revenue in the 1969/70, plus an additional flat sum of 5 percent across the 
board.
When its sources of revenue became more diversified and when politically 
it had become more powerful, the central government tended to be more 
authoritarian in imposing control over the regions of the outer islands. The regime 
then put an end to the SPP ADO scheme and replaced it with a subsidy system 
which removed any link with regional export performance. The new system took 
the form of grants from the central government to the regions defined according 
to the needs of each region, and with special attention given to the regions in 
deficit. Thus with this subsidy system the regime has made the regions more 
dependent on the subsidy from the centre.
The central government initiated the policy with a first year subsidy roughly 
equal to twice the sum the provinces had previously received under the SPP 
ADO, with no region receiving less than Rp. 500 million. Together with this fixed 
Rp. 500 million, the central government also provided each region with funds 
allocated on the basis of the length of provincial roads with a specific amount per 
kilometre. In addition, inclusive into SPP ADO and the funds on the basis of the 
length of provincial road, the central government also distributed funds allocated 
on the basis of cultivated areas, a scheme especially designed for the provinces 
lacking long roads. The cultivated areas included crops, plantations and 
palawija. The subsidy scheme also gave special attention to Jakarta because its 
urban area is much more extensive than any other region, and to Maluku
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because of its communication problems (Dept, of Information 1970, Leuwen 
1975).
The second biggest subsidy on the basis of area is the district subsidy or 
(Inpres Kabupaten). This subsidy is calculated on the basis of the population in 
the district concerned. Initially this subsidy was introduced at the rate of only 
Rp.50 per person; at the end of the first Repelita it rose to Rp. 150 per person , 
by the end of the second Repelita it had become Rp.300 per person and in the 
1978/79 budget it rose again to Rp.450 per person (Nota Keuangan 1980/81: 
219). This subsidy clearly benefited the populous rather than scarcely populated 
regions and as a result Java has gained more under this system of subsidy 
calculation. However ,it is important to note that many regions of the outer island 
have obtained much benefit from this Inpres system such as West Sumatra, 
South Sulawesi (Achmad I.A.1984)
This subsidy together with the provincial subsidy and all other subsidies, 
except the community health centre and reforestration subsidy, are directly 
handled by Ministry of Home Affairs authorities in the region concerned. The 
Community Health Centre and Reforestration subsidy needed the cooperation of 
other ministries. But overall the Ministry of Home Affairs is in charge in the 
implementation and the supervision of these subsidies in every region.
As the name "Inpres" for these projects indicates, their implementation is 
also regulated and carried out through Presidential Instructions. As a result all 
these projects have the privilege of by-passing the difficulties of the bureaucratic 
process, even by-passing the proposal and feasibility procedures of Bappenas. 
The financial arrangements are directly transferred through the Indonesian 
People’s Bank ( Bank Rakvat Indonesia) in every region.
In line with the objectives of this program to create "equal" development 
among the regions, the implementation of these subsidies, involving the 
selection of the projects and the contractors, has been entirely devolved to the 
provincial governments. But as observed by Richards, evidence in local surveys 
and comment in the press has indicated that political considerations and 
interests in the selection of the projects and of the contractors have been very 
influential so that the subsidies have not always been used to the best 
advantage of communities (Richards R.A. 1978 ). Further, although manipulation 
in the implementation of Inpres projects has been officially acknowledged even 
by authorities in the centre, there has been no further action from the central 
government (Merdeka, July 23, 1976). As a result, although many regions made 
progress in their regional development through these Inpres systems, yet the 
main objective of "creating equal development among regions" remains to be 
seen. In many aspects, as a consequence of manipulation in their 
implementation and lack of control from the central government, the system is 
more like a distribution of wealth from the central government to the regions, 
particularly considering Robison’s statement that almost all contractors who are 
awarded government projects are those who have connections or patronage from 
the authorities (Robison R. 1981). Nevertheless, these subsidies are very popular 
in the regions, and are instrumental in creating loyalty to the central government 
and particularly to the President.
In addition to central government subsidies in the form of Inpres there is 
also another fund which is allocated to the regions to support development, 
particularly when the regions urgently need additional funds. This fund is 
allocated through the Budget Item no XVI (Baaian Anqqaran XVH. also known as 
"Budget Item for Costs and Calculation" (Baaian Pembiayaan dan Perhitungan) 
which is directly controlled and authorized through the Presidential Office. These 
funds are available for a wide range of activities ranging from irrigation, electricity
and agriculture to projects of husbandry in the regions. According to Dorojatun 
Kuntjoroyakti :
"President Soeharto allocated Anggaran XVI funds according to his 
discretion, channelling them outside the traditional departmental 
and agency networks. In so doing the Office of the President 
represented by the State Secretariat was able to cut across the 
bureaucracy and gain access directly to all branches and levels of 
the government" (Kuntjorojakti, Dorodjatun 1981: 310-11).
From the discussion above we can see that development and economic 
growth in the regions are very dependent on the policy and the supply funds 
from the central government. According to Esmara, supply of funds from the 
central government to every region has made up 85 to 90 percent of the total 
regional development budgets with only 10 to 15 percent actually originating from 
regional sources (Esmara H. 1986: 215-235).
In this process of development the provincial governments have been 
forced to be passive. In some respects many regions have developed and their 
economies are growing because of the implementation of central government 
projects with their economic spill-over. This situation is clearly evident in 
economic growth in the regions of the outer islands, particularly in the regions 
which possess resource endowments and in the regions which are politically 
demanding. By contrast the poorer regions and those which are not politically 
critical to the central government have remained underdeveloped or at least 
have lagged behind other regions. Lorraine Corner draws a specific example 
from Nusatenggara. Nusatenggara, compared to other regions in Indonesia, is 
regarded as an arid and dry region, in other words a poor region with little 
political importance for the central government. As a result Nusatenggara 
economically is much less developed compared to other regions let alone in 
terms of infrastructures (Corner L. 1986).
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Although, through Presidential Projects the Regional governments do 
have the authority to execute development in accordance with their own needs, 
the general guide-lines have been laid down by the central government. To some 
extent the regional people through the so called Regional Development Planning 
Boards (Badan Perencanaan Pembanqunan Daerah:Bappeda). which have a 
role parallel to Bappenas, may propose their own plans or suggestions for their 
region, but the final decision is in the hands of Bappenas. In other words the 
"master plan" which has been designed by Bappenas is fixed.
Overall economic development in the regions, particularly the regions of 
the outer islands, is clearly a matter of implementation of central government 
projects in the regions, with Bappenas emerging as the pivotal national agency 
concerned with development planning. At the national level the Minister of 
Finance acts as the guardian of the public treasury, and other departments, such 
as the Department of Public Works and the Department of Agriculture, which are 
responsible for the physical implementation of the projects, act as the "spending 
advocate" (Wildavsky A.1974: 145-165). The Ministry of Home Affairs, which is 
responsible for coordination and supervision throughout the country, serves as 
"supervisor of development" with the Governors acting as central government 
agents, that is as the agent of the Minister of Home Affairs in the regions, who 
have to transmit and mediate central government policy in the region as well as 
act as the regional leader.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
From the discussion in chapter I and chapter IV it should by now be clear 
why the New Order regime has so far been able to prevent the outbreak of 
traditional regional challenges and has succeeded in maintaining the stability 
which is a prerequisite for the implementation of its development programs.
The regional rebellions that regularly burst out in the Old Order period 
were mainly manifestations of political civilian rivalries within the civilian and 
military elites over power and economic resources in the newly established 
state. In the case of the Darul Islam rebellion, it was clear that the rebels in their 
challenge to the central government did not constitute a unified Muslim 
movement. Each rebel leader, Kartosuwirjo, Kahar Muzakar and Daud 
Beureu’eh, had his own reasons to fight against rivals in the centre. It would be 
difficult to describe the Darul Islam rebellion in terms of an Islamic revolt against 
non-lslamic government because both sides, the rebels in the regions and the 
government in the centre consisted of a mixture of "strong" and "non-strong" 
Muslims. Regional rebellion as a manifestation of political rivalries in the civilian 
and military elites was even clearer in the case of PRRI/Permesta. Both sides, 
the central government and the rebels, comprised a mixture of the Javanese 
elite and the outer island regional elites, and included both pious Muslims and 
abangans.
The rebellions that occurred in the pre-1966 even also clearly indicated 
the weakness of the central government and the un-consolidated power of the 
regime. The situation was made worse when the central government was unable
to run its economic development program and the whole economic situation 
deteriorated.
Therefore, set against the experience in the past period, the New Order 
introduced policies that touched the roots of the problem. Firstly the New Order 
leadership consolidated power in the centre in order to create a strong central 
government, which consisted of the military and civilian elite from both Java and 
the outer island regions, although in this case the Javanese remained as the 
dominant group since they represented the largest ethnic community in the 
archipelago. Power was consolidated not only in the centre but also down to the 
regions and even to the villages. As a result the bureaucratic elites in the regions 
were not only regional leaders but more importantly became executive agents of 
the central government in the regions. The role of the regional leaders as central 
government executive agents is reflected by the way a governor is appointed. 
According to Law No 5 of the year 1974, although candidates for governor are 
elected by the Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakvat 
Daerah :DPRD). the appointment has to be approved by the President. If among 
the proposed candidates none is approved by the Central government then the 
Minister of Home Affairs can appoint any person from Jakarta or any other 
region. The task of the governing elite in the regions is to guarantee that the 
economic development policy of the central government is properly executed and 
to cooperate with the regional military command in controlling and preventing 
regional unrest.
The strategy of power consolidation from the centre to the regions has, in 
many respects, worked together with the economic development programs. The 
development programs which were brought about by the New Order government 
were not only financed with big foreign loans and foreign private capital but also 
generated tremendous revenue for the government, particularly from oil but also
from timber, mainly in the first two Repelitas and later liquid natural gas also 
added government income.
The economic development program carried out by the New Order 
government no doubt was able to revive the national economy and increase the 
standard of living of the people compared to the situation in the Old Order period, 
but more importantly from the point of view of this thesis, the development policy 
conducted by the government has tremendously improved the economic welfare 
of the elites in the centre and in the regions in contrast to what was achieved by 
the old regime. The New Order’s policy was not limited to the exploitation of 
economic sectors that generated a huge amount money but it also created a new 
group of businessmen under the patronage of the regime. Thus this economic 
development program became an instrument to strengthen elite consolidation 
from the centre to the regions and as a result also sustained stability.
This type of integration, which is based on elite consolidation sustained 
through the distribution of material benefits produced by the development 
program, clearly does not constitute a guarantee of eternal stability. But it 
appears that the central government backed by its coercive capacity has been 
able to buy the loyalty of the elite in the regions. The regions cannot afford not to 
be "loyal" to the central government.
In the long run this strategy perhaps will steadily strengthen integration as 
the regions get accustomed to it without the feeling of being forced. The elites 
can be expected to remain consolidated without suppression and coercion as 
long as their economic welfare is undisturbed. If, however the regions show a 
tendency display their grievances, then the central government must determine 
which activities are more effectively and conveniently undertaken on a regional
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basis and prepare to allow a limited degree of decentralization. In the meanwhile 
it is to be hoped that it will be possible to change the approach to the regional 
elites so that it no longer rests in a largely material basis. The regional elites, on 
the other hand, must be prepared to serve the government and ultimately the 
people.
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Table. VIII. Planned Growth in REPEL1TA III.
S E C T  0 R S Target in %
Agriculture 3 .5
Mining •4.0
Industry 11.0
Construction 9 .0
T r ansportation 10.0
Others 8 .0
T o t a l  ( G D P ; 6 .5
Source: Pidato Kenegaraan President 17 Agustus 1978
or Presidential State Address Speech August i7, 1
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